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On the persistence of corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Herbert Dawid
  • Gustav Feichtinger

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Herbert Dawid & Gustav Feichtinger, 1996. "On the persistence of corruption," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 177-193, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:64:y:1996:i:2:p:177-193
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01250114
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01250114
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
    2. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
    3. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco, 1995. "A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 89-122, June.
    4. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January.
    5. Hartl, Richard F., 1987. "A simple proof of the monotonicity of the state trajectories in autonomous control problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 211-215, February.
    6. Feichtinger, Gustav & Wirl, Franz, 1994. "On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 113-131, October.
    7. Michel, Philippe, 1982. "On the Transversality Condition in Infinite Horizon Optimal Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 975-985, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sanyal, Amal & Gang, Ira N & Goswami, Omkar, 2000. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 61-78, October.
    2. Paulo Melo-Filho, 2008. "Essays on Political Economy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002254, David K. Levine.
    3. Becker, Sascha & Egger, Peter H & Seidel, Tobias, 2008. "Corruption Epidemics," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2008-09, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
    4. M. Emranul Haque & Richard Kneller, 2007. "Business Cycle Synchronization of the Euro Area with the New and Negotiating Member Countries," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 92, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
    5. M. Haque & Richard Kneller, 2009. "Corruption clubs: endogenous thresholds in corruption and development," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 345-373, November.
    6. Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Feichtinger, Gustav & Grass, Dieter & Hartl, Richard F. & Kort, Peter M. & Novak, Andreas J. & Seidl, Andrea, 2013. "Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: An alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(3), pages 541-546.
    7. Herzfeld, Thomas & Weiss, Christoph, 2003. "Corruption and legal (in)effectiveness: an empirical investigation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 621-632, September.
    8. Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(1), pages 1-1.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal control; corruption; social norms; multiple equilibria; reputation dynamics; K42; C61; C62;

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

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