Expert advice for amateurs

Citations

Cited by:

1. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2020. "Custodial Interrogations," THEMA Working Papers 2020-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
2. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
   • Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers hal-00973071, HAL.
3. Itai Arieli & Ronen Gradwohl & Rann Smorodinsky, 2023. "Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk," Papers 2302.00281, arXiv.org.
4. Bijkerk, Suzanne H. & Karamychev, Vladimir & Swank, Otto H., 2018. "When words are not enough," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 294-314.
5. Chulyoung Kim & Paul S. Koh, 2020. "Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 282-305, September.
   • Chulyoung Kim & Paul S. Koh, 2018. "Court-Appointed Experts and Accuracy in Adversarial Litigation," Working papers 2018rwp-136, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
6. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
7. Starkov, Egor, 2023. "Only time will tell: Credible dynamic signaling," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
   • Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Discussion Papers 20-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
   • Egor Starkov, 2020. "Only Time Will Tell: Credible Dynamic Signaling," Papers 2007.09568, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
8. Sadakane, Hitoshi & Tam, Yin Chi, 2026. "Cheap talk and lie detection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 787-814.
9. Kitano, Wataru & Nakada, Satoshi, 2026. "On the possibility of strategic ignorance in sequential persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
10. Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2013. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 7610, IZA Network @ LISER.
    • Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2015. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 516, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
11. Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2024. "Cheap talk with two-sided private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 97-118.
12. Redlicki, Bartosz & Redlicki, Jakub, 2022. "Communication with Costly and Detectable Falsification," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 452-470.
13. Chiba, Saori & Hori, Kazumi, 2022. "Two-sided strategic information transmission," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 229-241.
    • Saori Chiba & Kazumi Hori, 2020. "Two-sided Strategic Information Transmission," KIER Working Papers 1029, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
14. Jeahan Jung & Jeong Yoo Kim, 2024. "Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, May.
15. Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Simple decision rules in small groups: Collegial rule vs. rotational rule," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 51-63.
16. Ispano, Alessandro, 2016. "Persuasion and receiver’s news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 60-63.
17. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
18. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    • Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised Jun 2015.
19. Oded Berman & Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi & Dmitry Krass, 2019. "Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1624-1641, April.
20. Avi Lichtig & Helene Mass, 2024. "Optimal Testing in Disclosure Games," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_543, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
21. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2019. "Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 303-334, September.
22. Søren Johansen & Anders Ryghn Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," CREATES Research Papers 2021-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    • Soeren Johansen & Anders Rygh Swensen, 2021. "Adjustment coefficients and exact rational expectations in cointegrated vector autoregressive models," Discussion Papers 21-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
23. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
24. Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2018. "The strategist and the tactician," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 427-434.
25. Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2024. "Designing Interrogations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(6), pages 3504-3531.
    • Alessandro Ispano & Peter Vida, 2021. "Designing Interrogations," Thema Working Papers 2021-02, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    • Alessandro Ispano & Péter Vida, 2024. "Designing Interrogations," Post-Print hal-04982914, HAL.
26. repec:ema:worpap:2021-02_v2 is not listed on IDEAS
27. Grillo, Edoardo, 2016. "The hidden cost of raising voters’ expectations: Reference dependence and politicians’ credibility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 126-143.