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On the possibility of strategic ignorance in sequential persuasion

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  • Kitano, Wataru
  • Nakada, Satoshi

Abstract

Compared to a Bayesian persuasion with a single sender S1, does adding a new sender S0, who publicly discloses information before S1’s disclosure, weakly increase the receiver’s payoff for any payoff profile? Li and Norman (2021) show that the answer is yes when the state is binary. This paper establishes the opposite direction: for the state space with more than two elements, we can construct a payoff profile where adding S0 strictly reduces the receiver’s payoff. This observation suggests that the sequential acquisition of information from multiple sources may be, even if it is costless, detrimental to the decision-maker: the sender S0’s information can be detrimental if it makes the receiver biased, and such bias is not removed by S1, which induces the receiver’s unwise decision. Thus, costless sequential acquisition of information from multiple sources can lead to the strategic disregard of certain information.

Suggested Citation

  • Kitano, Wataru & Nakada, Satoshi, 2026. "On the possibility of strategic ignorance in sequential persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:264:y:2026:i:c:s0165176526001795
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112985
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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