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Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals' likelihood of avoiding detection

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
  2. Karbowski, Adam, . "Kartele w trzech perspektywach: neoklasycznej, behawioralnej oraz etycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2015(3).
  3. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  4. Andarge, Tihitina & Lichtenberg, Erik, "undated". "Regulated Firm Strategy under Uncertainty about Regulatory Status," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274420, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  5. Eric Langlais, 2009. "On the Ambiguous Effects of Repression," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 93-94, pages 327-348.
  6. John Stranlund, 2007. "The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 99-117, September.
  7. Anthony Heyes, 1994. "Environmental enforcement when ‘inspectability’ is endogenous: A model with overshooting properties," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(5), pages 479-494, October.
  8. Ben-Shahar, Omri, 1997. "Playing without a rulebook: Optimal enforcement when individuals learn the penalty only by committing the crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 409-421, September.
  9. Sébastien ROUILLON, 2008. "Variable Probabilities of Suit and Liability Rules," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2008-15, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
  10. Eric Langlais, 2008. "Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetic," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(3), pages 371-382, June.
  11. Heyes, Anthony G., 1996. "Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 251-265, May.
  12. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties Without Commitment," Working papers 175, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  13. Tihitina Andarge & Erik Lichtenberg, 2020. "Regulatory compliance under enforcement gaps," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 181-202, June.
  14. Adam Karbowski, 2015. "Kartele w trzech perspektywach: neoklasycznej, behawioralnej oraz etycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 5-26.
  15. Zeljko Bogetic & Arye Hillman, 2005. "The Tax Base in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 1267 (March 1994), The World Bank," Public Economics 0510009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Friehe, Tim, 2008. "Optimal sanctions and endogeneity of differences in detection probabilities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 150-155, June.
  17. Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Too much or not enough crimes? On the ambiguous effects of repression," MPRA Paper 1575, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Harel, Alon & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 1(1-2), pages 276-312, Fall.
  19. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  20. Bogetic, Zeljko & Hillman, Arye L., 1994. "The tax base in transition : the case of Bulgaria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1267, The World Bank.
  21. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147.
  22. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
  23. Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.
  24. Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 278-288, April.
  25. Glen Ueng, K. L. & Yang, C. C., 2001. "Plea bargaining with the IRS: extensions and further results," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 83-98, July.
  26. Lambin, Xavier & Raizonville, Adrien, 2025. "From black box to glass box: algorithmic explainability as a strategic decision," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
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