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Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 61-71.
  2. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Mergers in Bidding Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 760-767.
  5. Dalkir, Serdar & Logan, John W. & Masson, Robert T., 2000. "Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 383-413, April.
  6. Omer Biran, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," Working Papers halshs-00608008, HAL.
  7. Loyola, Gino, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083318, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  8. Lebrun, Bernard, 2009. "Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1341-1351, May.
  9. Chernomaz, Kirill, 2012. "On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 690-710.
  10. Burguet Roberto & Perry Martin K, 2007. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-27, June.
  11. Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "Information Revelation And Buyer Profits In Repeated Procurement Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.
  12. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
  13. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
  14. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2003. "Preferred Suppliers and Vertical Integration in Auction Market," Working Papers 74, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  15. de Frutos, M. Angeles, 2000. "Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 48-71, October.
  16. Gugler, Klaus Peter & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2015. "Analysis of mergers in first-price auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Oliver Budzinski & Arndt Christiansen, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary Merger Control," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200702, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  18. Kumar, Vikram & Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. & Samkharadze, Lily, 2015. "Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 71-80.
  19. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
  20. Cantillon, Estelle, 2008. "The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-25, January.
  21. Lebrun, Bernard, 2006. "Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 131-151, April.
  22. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7891 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Tong Li & Bingyu Zhang, 2015. "Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 188-214, May.
  24. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4100 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Vincent van den Berg, 2012. "Advantaged Bidders in Franchise Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-117/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
  26. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2014. "Preferred Suppliers in Asymmetric Auction Markets," Working Papers 791, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  27. Michael H. Rothkopf & Ronald M. Harstad & Yuhong Fu, 2003. "Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(1), pages 71-84, January.
  28. Charles J. Thomas, 2017. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Working Papers 17-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  29. Charles J. Thomas, 2019. "A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 459-491, November.
  30. Thomas, Charles J., 1997. "Disincentives for cost-reducing investment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 359-363, December.
  31. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2019. "Merger review with intermediate buyer power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  32. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise, June.
  33. Cheng, Harrison, 2011. "Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 78-80, April.
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