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Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Schober, Dominik & Weber, Christoph, 2015. "Refinancing under yardstick regulation with investment cycles: The case of long-lived electricity network assets," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-065, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  2. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
  3. Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton & Raphael Boleslavsky, 2017. "Competing For Capital: Auditing And Credibility In Financial Reporting," Working Paper 1377, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  4. Spiegel, Yossef, 1997. "The choice of technology and capital structure under rate regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 191-216, April.
  5. Roider, Andreas, 2007. "Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope," IZA Discussion Papers 3117, IZA Network @ LISER.
  6. Guerriero, Carmine, 2011. "Accountability in government and regulatory policies: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 453-469.
  7. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Doug Schroeder, 2000. "Accounting Information, Aggregation, and Discriminant Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(6), pages 790-806, June.
  8. Andreas Roider, 2009. "Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 193-209, June.
  9. Yossef Spiegel & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Investment in a New Technology as a Signal of Firm Value Under Regulatory Opportunism," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 251-276, June.
  10. Dutta, Sunil & Fan, Qintao, 2012. "Incentives for innovation and centralized versus delegated capital budgeting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 592-611.
  11. Dominik Schober, 2013. "Refinancing under Yardstick Regulation with Investment Cycles–The Case of Long-Lived Electricity Network Assets," EWL Working Papers 1321, University of Duisburg-Essen, Chair for Management Science and Energy Economics, revised Jun 2013.
  12. Onjewu, Adah-Kole Emmanuel & Olan, Femi & Nyuur, Richard Benon-be-isan & Paul, Salima & Nguyen, Ha Thanh Truc, 2023. "The effect of government support on Bureaucracy, COVID-19 resilience and export intensity: Evidence from North Africa," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
  13. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover, 2003. "Abandonment Options and Information System Design," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 29-45, March.
  14. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
  15. Joel Sobel, 1999. "A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 33-60, March.
  16. Raphael Boleslavsky & Bruce Carlin & Christopher Cotton, 2021. "A Model of Challenge Funds: How Funding Availability and Selection Rigor Affect Project Quality," Working Paper 1470, Economics Department, Queen's University.
  17. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
  18. Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian, 2004. "Purchasing sleeping patents to curtail budget padding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 221-226, February.
  19. Guerriero, Carmine, 2013. "The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 91-107.
  20. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
  21. Donald, Stephen G & Sappington, David E M, 1995. "Explaining the Choice among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 237-265, Summer.
  22. Sherman, Roger, 1989. "Institutional design for monopoly regulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2-3), pages 245-257.
  23. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Jonathan Glover & K. Sivaramakrishnan, 2000. "Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 205-216, February.
  24. Prat, Andrea & Halac, Marina, 2014. "Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement," CEPR Discussion Papers 10035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  26. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18946 is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Dikolli, Shane S. & Vaysman, Igor, 2006. "Information technology, organizational design, and transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 201-234, April.
  28. Dai, Chifeng, 2009. "The appeals process in principal-agent relationships," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 451-462, August.
  29. Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia & Dolores Garrido, 2023. "Measuring regulatory errors from environmental policy uncertainty," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 48-65, December.
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