Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy

Citations

Cited by:

1. Peretz, Ron, 2012. "The strategic value of recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 332-351.
2. Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron, 2019. "Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 131-145.
3. Hernández, Penélope & Solan, Eilon, 2016. "Bounded computational capacity equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 342-364.
   • Eilon Solan & Penélope Hernández, 2014. "Bounded Computational Capacity Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0314, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
4. Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 413-424, May.
   • Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Post-Print hal-00487954, HAL.
5. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
   • Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics.
   • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   • Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 573, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
   • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NBER Working Papers 12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org.
6. Mehrdad Valizadeh & Amin Gohari, 2021. "Simulation of a Random Variable and its Application to Game Theory," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 452-470, May.
7. Ron Peretz, 2007. "The Strategic Value of Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp470, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
8. Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Discussion Paper Series dp476, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
   • Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001945, David K. Levine.
   • Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002427, David K. Levine.
9. O'Connell, Thomas C. & Stearns, Richard E., 2003. "On finite strategy sets for finitely repeated zero-sum games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 107-136, April.
10. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
11. Ron Peretz, 2013. "Correlation through bounded recall strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 867-890, November.
12. Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "How to play with a biased coin?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 206-226, November.
    • O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 1999. "How to play with a biased coin ?," THEMA Working Papers 99-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Vieille, 2002. "How to play with a biased coin?," Post-Print hal-00464984, HAL.
    • Gossner, O. & Vieille, N., 1999. "How to play with a biased coin?," Papers 99-31, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
13. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Better-Reply Dynamics with Bounded Recall," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 869-879, November.
    • Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Better-Reply Dynamics with Bounded Recall," Discussion Papers 2, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Mar 2008.
14. Ron Peretz, 2007. "The Strategic Value of Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001774, UCLA Department of Economics.
15. JIMENEZ Edward, 2002. "Unified Game Theory," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 25, Society for Computational Economics.
16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6127 is not listed on IDEAS
17. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
18. Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo, 2008. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 395-409, November.
    • Amparo Urbano Salvador & Penélope Hernández Rojas, 2000. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
19. Valizadeh, Mehrdad & Gohari, Amin, 2019. "Playing games with bounded entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 363-380.
20. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6885 is not listed on IDEAS
21. Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
    • Olivier Gossner & Johannes Hörner, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Post-Print halshs-00754488, HAL.
22. Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 2009. "Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 404-425, May.
    • Abraham Neyman Null & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Departmental Working Papers 200514, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp411, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
23. Ron Peretz, 2011. "Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies," Discussion Paper Series dp579, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
24. Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000920, UCLA Department of Economics.
25. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
26. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
27. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
28. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández, 2003. "On the Complexity of Coordination," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 127-140, February.
    • O. Gossner & P. Hernandez, 2001. "On the complexity of coordination," THEMA Working Papers 2001-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • GOSSNER, Olivier & HERNANDEZ, Pénélope, 2001. "On the complexity of coordination," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
29. Hu, Tai-Wei, 2014. "Unpredictability of complex (pure) strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 1-15.