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To be (unionized) or not to be? A case for cost-raising strategies under Cournot oligopoly

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Arijit Mukherjee & Laixun Zhao, 2012. "Profitable parallel trade in unionized markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(3), pages 267-276, November.
  2. Mukherjee, Soma & Broll, Udo & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2007. "Licensing by a monopolist and unionized labor market," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 09/07, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  3. Cao, Jiyun & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2018. "Foreign direct investment, unionised labour markets and welfare," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 330-339.
  4. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2015. "Bargaining agenda in a unionised monopoly with network effects," MPRA Paper 64090, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Noriaki Matsushima & Kazuki Nishikawa & Jiaying Qiu, 2026. "The effects of minimum wage in inter-regional duopoly competition," OSIPP Discussion Paper 26E003, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
  6. Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Product market competition, external economies of scale and unionized wage," Discussion Papers 11/14, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2007:i:17:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Mukherjee, Arijit & Pennings, Enrico, 2011. "Unionization structure, licensing and innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 232-241, March.
  9. Arijit Mukherjee, 2007. "Irrelevance of productivity difference: A case with labor union," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(17), pages 1-8.
  10. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2019. "When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 711-722, November.
  11. Domenico Buccella, 2016. "Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 15(1), pages 17-31, April.
  12. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2016. "Bargaining Agenda and Entry in a Unionised Model with Network Effects," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 2(1), pages 91-121, March.
  13. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2015. "Bargaining agenda, timing, and entry," MPRA Paper 64089, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Asproudis, Elias & Filippiadis, Eleftherios, 2021. "Bargaining for Community Fishing Quotas," MPRA Paper 107409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Debasmita Basak & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Unionisation structure and product innovation," Discussion Papers 11/12, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  16. Dibyendu Maiti & Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Trade Liberalisation, Subcontracting and Unionised Wage," Discussion Papers 10/07, University of Nottingham, GEP.
  17. Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann & Anke Gerber, 2003. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution in Labor-Market Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series 941, CESifo.
  18. Luciano Fanti, 2014. "Union-Firm Bargaining agenda: Right-to manage or Efficient Bargaining?," Discussion Papers 2014/182, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  19. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2010. "Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 735-742, August.
  20. Domenico Buccella & Luciano Fanti, 2017. "A game-theoretic approach to the choice of union-oligopoly baargaining agenda," Discussion Papers 2017/214, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  21. Luciano Fanti, 2015. "Union–firm bargaining agenda: right-to-manage or efficient bargaining?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 936-948.
  22. Renu Bansal & Dibyendu Maiti, 2024. "Capital Inflow, Strategic Subcontracting, and Formal Employment," Working papers 348, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  23. Kopel, Michael & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Ressi, Anna, 2019. "Endogenous scope of firm-union bargaining with vertical pay comparisons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 39-52.
  24. Debasmita Basak & Andreas Hoefele & Arijit Mukherjee, 2022. "Wage bargaining and product innovation: The role of market expansion effect," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(3), pages 319-340, June.
  25. Domenico Buccella & Luciano Fanti, 2025. "Bargaining Agendas as Strategic Tools," The Indian Journal of Labour Economics, Springer;The Indian Society of Labour Economics (ISLE), vol. 68(1), pages 99-118, March.
  26. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2013. "Endogenous domestic market structure and the effects of a trade cost reduction in a unionised industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 30-33.
  27. Debasmita Basak & Andreas Hoefele & Arijit Mukherjee, 2014. "Union Bargaining Power and Product Innovation: Relevance of the Preference Function," CESifo Working Paper Series 5007, CESifo.
  28. Buccella, Domenico & Fanti, Luciano, 2020. "Do labour union recognition and bargaining deter entry in a network industry? A sequential game model," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  29. repec:ehu:dfaeii:6745 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Luciano Fanti, 2014. "When do firms and unions agree on a monopoly union or an efficient bargaining arrangement?," Discussion Papers 2014/181, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  31. Arijit Mukherjee, 2008. "Unionised Labour Market and Strategic Production Decision of a Multinational," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1621-1639, October.
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