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Citations for "Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation"

by Yeon-Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim

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  1. Tilman Börgers & Peter Norman, 2005. "A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000171, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo, 2009. "Optimal collusion-proof auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 565-603, March.
  3. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  4. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Celik, Gorkem, 2004. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-04-01-23-02-48-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 27 Jan 2008.
  6. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design," Working Papers 200606, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  7. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2008. "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2008-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  8. Martin Hellwig, 2015. "Financial Stability and Monetary Policy," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  9. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
  10. Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2012. "Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1300-1312.
  11. Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2012. "Is Collusion Proof Auction Expensive? Estimates from Highway Procurements," MPRA Paper 57353, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Feb 2014.
  12. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2016. "Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(4), pages 1073-99, April.
  13. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
  14. Arai, Koki & Ishibashi, Ikuo & Ishii-Ishibashi, Rieko, 2011. "Research and analysis on bid rigging mechanisms," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-5, January.
  15. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2011. "Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 84-96, January.
  16. Thomas Tröger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  17. Dequiedt, V., 2006. "Efficient collusion in optimal auctions," Working Papers 200607, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  18. Jansen, Jos & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "The organization of regulated production: Complementarities, correlation and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 327-353, January.
  19. Felix J. Bierbrauer & Martin F. Hellwig, 2015. "Public-Good Provision in Large Economies," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  20. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September.
  21. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
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