On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games

Citations

Cited by:

1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2020. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions?," ECON - Working Papers 364, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
   • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2020. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions ?," Working Papers ECARES 2020-40, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
2. Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2004. "Correlated equilibrium and behavioral conformity," Economic Research Papers 269625, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
   • Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0526, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
   • Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 732, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
3. Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G.R. & Savin, N.E., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers 98-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
   • DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1998-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   • Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," CIG Working Papers FS IV 98-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
   • DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Other publications TiSEM 4a8b4f46-f30b-4ad2-bb0c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
4. Subhasish Dugar & Quazi Shahriar, 2012. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: The Role of Relative Label Salience," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(3), pages 954-975, January.
5. Tom Wilkening, 2009. "The Informational Properties of Institutions: An Experimental Study of Persistence in Markets with Certification," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1087, The University of Melbourne.
6. Michele Bernasconi & Matteo Galizzi, 2010. "Network formation in repeated interactions: experimental evidence on dynamic behaviour," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 9(2), pages 193-228, December.
7. Verena Kurz & Andreas Orland & Kinga Posadzy, 2018. "Fairness versus efficiency: how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 601-626, September.
   • Kurz, Verena & Orland, Andreas & Posadzy, Kinga, 2016. "Fairness Versus Efficiency: How Procedural Fairness Concerns Affect Coordination," LiU Working Papers in Economics 3, Linköping University, Division of Economics, Department of Management and Engineering.
8. Ed Hopkins, 2002. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2141-2166, November.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 51, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 625018000000000226, www.najecon.org.
   • Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000226, David K. Levine.
9. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2019. "Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-12.
10. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2022. "Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 203-228, February.
    • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2020. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions?," ECON - Working Papers 364, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2021. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions ?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/322288, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
11. Bernardo A. Huberman & Tad Hogg HP Laboratories, 2003. "Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 0306005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
12. Alm, James & McKee, Michael, 2004. "Tax compliance as a coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 297-312, July.
13. Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015. "Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 496-511.
    • Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 53, Peruvian Economic Association.
    • Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2015-9, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
14. John Cadigan, 2005. "The Citizen Candidate Model: An Experimental Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 197-216, April.
15. Anders Poulsen & Axel Sonntag, 2019. "Focality is Intuitive - Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Time Pressure in Coordination Games," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 19-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Sonntag, Axel & Poulsen, Anders, 2019. "Focality is intuitive - Experimental evidence on the effects of time pressure in coordination games," MPRA Paper 92262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
16. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005. "An experimental study of costly coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May.
    • Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, "undated". "An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination," Virginia Economics Online Papers 326, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
17. John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December.
18. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
19. David Bodoff, 2013. "When learning meets salience," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 241-266, February.
20. Lee Cronk & Athena Aktipis & Steven Gazzillo & Dave White & Amber Wutich & Barry Sopher, 2019. "Common knowledge promotes risk pooling in an experimental economic game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(8), pages 1-15, August.
21. Gary E. Bolton & Kalyan Chatterjee & Kathleen L. McGinn, 2013. "How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 6, pages 113-128, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Gary E. Bolton & Kalyan Chatterjee & Kathleen L. McGinn, 2003. "How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(5), pages 583-598, May.
22. Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Other publications TiSEM 138dc36b-5269-421a-9e79-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Discussion Paper 2000-09, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
23. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Behavioral Properties of Correlated Equilibrium; Social Group Structures with Conformity and Stereotyping," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0814, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
24. Van Huyck, John & Battalio, Raymond, 2002. "Prudence, Justice, Benevolence, and Sex: Evidence from Similar Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 227-246, May.
25. Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008.
    • Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen-Van, 2009. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 02, Development and Policies Research Center (DEPOCEN), Vietnam.
26. Pilwon Kim & Dongryul Lee, 2019. "Repeated minimum-effort coordination games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 1343-1359, September.
27. George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1852, Econometric Society.
28. Martin Sefton, 1999. "A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 151-164, December.
29. Rankin, Frederick W. & Van Huyck, John B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 2000. "Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 315-337, August.