IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ecj/econjl/v100y1990i403p1109-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Olivella, P. & Aron, D.J., 1991. "Bonuses and Penalties as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 153.91, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. David Card & Gordon B. Dahl, 2011. "Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 103-143.
  3. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2007. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 577-598, September.
  4. Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2016. "Born free," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 1-10.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2011. "The Economics of Labor Coercion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(2), pages 555-600, March.
  6. Bernd Beber & Christopher Blattman, 2010. "The Industrial Organization of Rebellion: The Logic of Forced Labor and Child Soldiering," HiCN Working Papers 72, Households in Conflict Network.
  7. Rauscher, Michael & Willert, Bianca, 2020. "Modern slavery, corruption, and hysteresis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
  8. Francis Bloch & Vijayendra Rao, 2002. "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1029-1043, September.
  9. James J. Feigenbaum & Soumyajit Mazumder & Cory B. Smith, 2020. "When Coercive Economies Fail: The Political Economy of the US South After the Boll Weevil," NBER Working Papers 27161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Robert Dur & Ola Kvaløy & Anja Schöttner, 2022. "Leadership Styles and Labor Market Conditions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 3150-3168, April.
  11. Mayshar, Joram & Moav, Omer & Neeman, Zvika, 2017. "Geography, Transparency, and Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 622-636, August.
  12. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
  13. Gerard Padró I Miquel & Pierre Yared, 2012. "The Political Economy of Indirect Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(2), pages 947-1015.
  14. Shoji, Masahiro & Tsubota, Kenmei, 2022. "Sexual exploitation of trafficked children: Survey evidence from child sex workers in Bangladesh," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 101-117.
  15. Mazumder, Soumyajit & Yan, Alan, 2020. "What Do Americans Want From (Private) Government? Experimental Evidence Demonstrates that Americans Want Workplace Democracy," SocArXiv j9asz, Center for Open Science.
  16. Masahiro Shoji & Kenmei Tsubota, 2018. "Sexual Exploitation of Trafficked Children: Evidence from Bangladesh," Working Papers 175, JICA Research Institute.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
  18. Kaushik Basu, 1999. "Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1083-1119, September.
  19. Willert, Bianca, 2018. "Masters and slaves: A matching approach with heterogeneous workers," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 159, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  20. Helmut Bester & Johannes Münster, 2016. "Subjective evaluation versus public information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(4), pages 723-753, April.
  21. Michael Rauscher & Bianca Willert, 2019. "Slavery, Corruption, and Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 7944, CESifo.
  22. Rauscher, Michael & Willert, Bianca, 2019. "Slavery, corruption, and institutions," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 164, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  23. Haluk Ergin & Serdar Sayan, 1997. "A Microeconomic Analysis of Slavery in Comparison to Free Labor Economies," Working Papers 9708, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
  24. Bond, Philip & Newman, Andrew F., 2009. "Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 526-540, October.
  25. Jonathan Conning, 2004. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 401, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  26. Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & de Oliveira Guilherme, 2021. "Slavery versus Labor," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 495-568, November.
  27. Bruce A. Weinberg, 2001. "An Incentive Model of the Effect of Parental Income on Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 266-280, April.
  28. Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "A theory of family education incentives and inequality," MPRA Paper 57913, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  29. Saito, Tetsuya, 2005. "Managerial Strategies of the Cotton South," MPRA Paper 181, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2006.
  30. Alex Barrachina & Víctor González-Chordá, 2016. "To report or not to report: Applying game theory to nursing error reporting," Working Papers 2016/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.