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Economic Consequences of Organized Violence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo‐Governments: Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  2. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, January.
  3. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens," CEPN Working Papers 2017-14, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
  4. Federico Varese, 2005. "How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the `Ndrangheta in Northern Italy," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _059, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Cursed by Resources or Institutions?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(8), pages 1117-1131, August.
  6. Langlois, Richard N., 2013. "Business groups and the natural state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 14-26.
  7. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
  8. Hicks, Daniel L., 2013. "War and the political zeitgeist: Evidence from the history of female suffrage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 60-81.
  9. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Plunder & Protection Inc," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 447-459, July.
  10. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 393-428, June.
  11. Boerner, Lars, 2016. "Medieval market making brokerage regulations in Central Western Europe, ca. 1250-1700," Economic History Working Papers 66834, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  12. Peter J. Boettke & Rosolino A. Candela, 2020. "Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 331-352, March.
  13. Coccia, Mario, 2015. "General sources of general purpose technologies in complex societies: Theory of global leadership-driven innovation, warfare and human development," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 199-226.
  14. Bruce L. Benson, 2020. "The development and evolution of predatory-state institutions and organizations: beliefs, violence, conquest, coercion, and rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 303-329, March.
  15. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
  16. Altman, Morris, 2000. "A behavioral model of path dependency: the economics of profitable inefficiency and market failure," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 127-145.
  17. François Facchini, 2008. "L’invention des institutions de la liberté en Europe : fragmentation politique, fragmentation géographique et religion," Post-Print hal-01395634, HAL.
  18. Yasin Arslantaş & Antoine Pietri & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2020. "State predation in historical perspective: the case of Ottoman müsadere practice during 1695–1839," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 417-442, March.
  19. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  20. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-17, May.
  21. Altman, Morris, 2001. "Culture, human agency, and economic theory: culture as a determinant of material welfare," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 379-391.
  22. Boaz Moselle & Ben Polak, 1997. "A Model of a Predatory State," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1158, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  23. Anja Shortland & Federico Varese, 2012. "The Business of Pirate Protection," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 75, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  24. Charles Angelucci & Simone Meraglia, 2015. "Trade, Law and Order, and Political Liberties: Theory and Application to English Medieval Boroughs," Discussion Papers 1509, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  25. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  26. Edgardo Barandiarán, 1989. "Una Teoría sobre el Monopolio Estatal del Dinero," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 26(77), pages 11-24.
  27. Irigoin, A, 2012. "Bounded Leviathan: or why North & Weingast are only right on the right half," MPRA Paper 39722, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Irigoin, Alejandra & Grafe, Regina, 2012. "Bounded Leviathan: or why North and Weingast are only right on the right half," Economic History Working Papers 44492, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  29. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  30. Pacala Anca, 2016. "The Modern Enterprise - Successor of Business Organization Forms in Ancient Rome and Medieval Europe," Oradea Journal of Business and Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 7-16, March.
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