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Economic Consequences of Organized Violence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, January.
  2. repec:hal:cepnwp:hal-01583559 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Plunder & Protection Inc," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 447-459, July.
  4. Boerner, Lars, 2016. "Medieval market making brokerage regulations in Central Western Europe, ca. 1250-1700," Economic History Working Papers 66834, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  5. Anja Shortland & Federico Varese, 2012. "The Business of Pirate Protection," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 75, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  6. Charles Angelucci & Simone Meraglia, 2015. "Trade, Law and Order, and Political Liberties: Theory and Application to English Medieval Boroughs," Discussion Papers 1509, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  7. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  8. Irigoin, A, 2012. "Bounded Leviathan: or why North & Weingast are only right on the right half," MPRA Paper 39722, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. repec:ehl:wpaper:44492 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  11. Federico Varese, 2005. "How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the `Ndrangheta in Northern Italy," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _059, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Cursed by Resources or Institutions?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(8), pages 1117-1131, August.
  13. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
  14. Bruce L. Benson, 2020. "The development and evolution of predatory-state institutions and organizations: beliefs, violence, conquest, coercion, and rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 303-329, March.
  15. Altman, Morris, 2000. "A behavioral model of path dependency: the economics of profitable inefficiency and market failure," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 127-145.
  16. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens," Working Papers hal-01583559, HAL.
  17. Yasin Arslantaş & Antoine Pietri & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2020. "State predation in historical perspective: the case of Ottoman müsadere practice during 1695–1839," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 417-442, March.
  18. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  19. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-17, May.
  20. François Facchini, 2008. "L’invention des institutions de la liberté en Europe : fragmentation politique, fragmentation géographique et religion," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01395634, HAL.
  21. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo‐Governments: Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
  22. Langlois, Richard N., 2013. "Business groups and the natural state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 14-26.
  23. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 393-428, June.
  24. Coccia, Mario, 2015. "General sources of general purpose technologies in complex societies: Theory of global leadership-driven innovation, warfare and human development," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 199-226.
  25. Altman, Morris, 2001. "Culture, human agency, and economic theory: culture as a determinant of material welfare," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 379-391.
  26. Boaz Moselle & Ben Polak, 1997. "A Model of a Predatory State," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1158, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  27. Hicks, Daniel L., 2013. "War and the political zeitgeist: Evidence from the history of female suffrage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 60-81.
  28. Peter J. Boettke & Rosolino A. Candela, 2020. "Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 331-352, March.
  29. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
  30. Edgardo Barandiarán, 1989. "Una Teoría sobre el Monopolio Estatal del Dinero," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 26(77), pages 11-24.
  31. Pacala Anca, 2016. "The Modern Enterprise - Successor of Business Organization Forms in Ancient Rome and Medieval Europe," Oradea Journal of Business and Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 7-16, March.
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