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Citations for "Private observation and Communication and Collusion"

by Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima

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  1. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001105, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
  3. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2012. "Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 387, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Iossa, Elisabetta & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B," CEPR Discussion Papers 8195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
  8. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
  10. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1237, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Other publications TiSEM 432fc615-feb9-4c90-8a14-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  13. Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 12867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Scholarly Articles 11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-04, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  16. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  17. Obara, Ichiro, 2009. "Folk theorem with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 120-134, January.
  18. Frank Verboben, 1997. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  19. Verboven, F.L., 1995. "Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior," Discussion Paper 1995-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  20. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2007. "Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 61-92, May.
  21. Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2008. "How Robust is the Folk Theorem with Imperfect," 2008 Meeting Papers 895, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  22. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  23. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2012. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 587, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  24. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  25. Kandori, Michihiro, 2002. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-15, January.
  26. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.