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An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices

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Cited by:

  1. Brito, Duarte & Osório, António & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018. "Unilateral effects screens for partial horizontal acquisitions: The generalized HHI and GUPPI," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 127-189.
  2. Leech, Dennis, 2010. "Power Indices in Large Voting Bodies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 942, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Carlos Pombo & Cristian Pinto-Gutierrez & Mauricio Jara-Betín, 2022. "Multiple large shareholder coalitions, institutional ownership and investment decisions: Evidence from cross-border deals in Latin America," Documentos CEDE 20333, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  4. Edwards, Jeremy S.S. & Weichenrieder, Alfons J., 2009. "Control rights, pyramids, and the measurement of ownership concentration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 489-508, October.
  5. Brito, Duarte & Ribeiro, Ricardo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2018. "Quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 108-149.
  6. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Bermig, Andreas & Dilger, Alexander, 2013. "Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretic analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 51-74.
  7. Elisabeth Mueller, 2008. "Benefits of control, capital structure and company growth," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(21), pages 2721-2734.
  8. Dennis Leech, 2003. "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(6), pages 831-837, June.
  9. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Power Indices As An Aid To Institutional Design : The Generalised Apportionment Problem," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 648, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  10. Ke, Changxia & Morath, Florian & Newell, Anthony & Page, Lionel, 2022. "Too big to prevail: The paradox of power in coalition formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 394-410.
  11. Boratyn, Daria & Kirsch, Werner & Słomczyński, Wojciech & Stolicki, Dariusz & Życzkowski, Karol, 2020. "Average weights and power in weighted voting games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 90-99.
  12. Crama, Yves & Leruth, Luc, 2007. "Control and voting power in corporate networks: Concepts and computational aspects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 178(3), pages 879-893, May.
  13. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  14. Matteo Migheli, 2016. "Measuring Representativeness in Different Electoral Systems, Using Italian and Dutch Data," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 723-748, July.
  15. Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J.M. & Fernandez, J.R., 2007. "The distribution of power in the European Constitution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(3), pages 1752-1766, February.
  16. Jeremy Edwards & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2004. "How Weak is the Weakest-Link Principle? On the Measurement of Firm Owners’ Control Rights," CESifo Working Paper Series 1255, CESifo.
  17. Ammari, Aymen & Bouteska, Ahmed & Regaieg, Boutheina, 2016. "CEO Entrenchment and Performance: New Evidence Using Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis," MPRA Paper 75529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Ching Yi Yeh & Tai Ma, 2012. "Why Do Insiders Sometimes Pay More And Sometimes Pay Less In Private Placements?," The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 6(2), pages 35-52.
  19. André Casajus & Frank Huettner, 2019. "The Coleman–Shapley index: being decisive within the coalition of the interested," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 275-289, December.
  20. Agnieszka Szczypinska, 2018. "Who Gains More Power in the EU after Brexit?," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 68(1), pages 18-33, February.
  21. Jan‐Erik Lane & Reinert Maeland, 2006. "International Organisation as Coordination in N‐Person Games," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(1), pages 185-215, March.
  22. Leech, Dennis, 2001. "This paper illustrates that an international permit trading system may hurt relatively poor countries by making associated economic activities una¤ordable. A model is constructed in which the free mar," Economic Research Papers 269358, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  23. Takayuki Mizuno & Shohei Doi & Shuhei Kurizaki, 2020. "The power of corporate control in the global ownership network," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(8), pages 1-19, August.
  24. Ben Hermans & Herbert Hamers & Roel Leus & Roy Lindelauf, 2019. "Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(6), pages 451-468, September.
  25. Leech, D., 2001. "Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 587, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  26. Dennis Leech & Robert Leech, 2006. "Voting power and voting blocs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 285-303, June.
  27. Dennis Leech, 2001. "Shareholder Voting Power and Corporate Governance: A Study of Large British Companies," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 27, pages 33-54.
  28. Leech, Dennis, 2010. "Power Indices in Large Voting Bodies," Economic Research Papers 270996, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  29. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Shareholder Voting Power and Ownership Control of Companies," Economic Research Papers 269335, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
  30. Changxia Ke & Florian Morath & Anthony Newell & Lionel Page, 2016. "Too big to prevail: Coalition formations in the presence of a superpower," QuBE Working Papers 044, QUT Business School.
  31. Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu Martin, 2006. "Analyse spatiale du pouvoir de vote : application au cas de l'intercommunalité dans le département du Val d'Oise," THEMA Working Papers 2006-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  32. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computation of Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 644, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  33. Frédéric Bobay, 2001. "La réforme du Conseil de l'Union européenne à partir de la théorie des jeux," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(2), pages 3-61.
  34. Taylan Mavruk & Conny Overland & Stefan Sjögren, 2020. "Keeping it real or keeping it simple? Ownership concentration measures compared," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(4), pages 958-1005, September.
  35. Madeleine Hosli & Rebecca Moody & Bryan O’Donovan & Serguei Kaniovski & Anna Little, 2011. "Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 163-187, July.
  36. Chrisostomos Florackis & Aydin Ozkan, 2009. "The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(3), pages 497-528, June.
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