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A Visible Hand? Bond Markets, Political Parties, Balanced Budget Laws, and State Government Debt

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Francisco Roch, 2012. "Fiscal rules and the sovereign default premium," Working Paper 12-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  2. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
  3. Mark Hallerberg & Guntram Wolff, 2008. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 379-396, September.
  4. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen & David Skilling, 2001. "Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Popularity, and the Scale of Government: Evidence from the States," EPRU Working Paper Series 01-16, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Jeffrey Clemens & Stephen Miran, 2012. "Fiscal Policy Multipliers on Subnational Government Spending," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 46-68, May.
  6. Gebhard Kirchgassner, 2002. "The effects of fiscal institutions on public finance: a survey of the empirical evidence," Chapters, in: Stanley L. Winer & Hirofumi Shibata (ed.), Political Economy and Public Finance, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  7. Brändle, Thomas & Elsener, Marc, 2023. "Do fiscal rules matter? A survey on recent evidence," Working papers 2023/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  8. Heinemann, Friedrich & Osterloh, Steffen & Kalb, Alexander, 2014. "Sovereign risk premia: The link between fiscal rules and stability culture," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 110-127.
  9. Asger Lau Andersen & David Dreyer Lassen & Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2012. "Late Budgets," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 1-40, November.
    • Asger L. Andersen & David Dreyer Lassen & Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2010. "Late Budgets," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  10. Jeffrey Clemens & Stephen Miran, 2012. "Fiscal Policy Multipliers on Subnational Government Spending," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 46-68, May.
  11. Heidi Jane Smith & Gabriel Purón Cid & Irving Rosales, 2019. "The Teaching of Public Finance and Budgeting as an Indicator of the Quality of Public Service Education in Mexico," Working Paper Series Sobre México 2019003, Sobre México. Temas en economía.
  12. Tima T. Moldogaziev & Sharon N. Kioko & W. Bartley Hildreth, 2017. "Impact of Bankruptcy Eligibility Requirements and Statutory Liens on Borrowing Costs," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(4), pages 47-73, December.
  13. Clemens, Jeffrey & Cutler, David M., 2014. "Who pays for public employee health costs?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 65-76.
  14. Feld, Lars P. & Kalb, Alexander & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Osterloh, Steffen, 2017. "Sovereign bond market reactions to no-bailout clauses and fiscal rules – The Swiss experience," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 319-343.
  15. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2005. "The Political Budget Cycle is Where You Can't See It: Transparency and Fiscal Manipulation," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  16. António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles, 2019. "Fiscal Rules and Government Financing Costs," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(1), pages 71-90, March.
  17. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo.
  18. Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza & W Mark C Weidemaier & Gracie Willingham, 0. "When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 41-74.
  19. António Afonso & João Jalles, 2017. "Do Fiscal Rules Lower Government Financing Costs?," Working Papers REM 2017/15, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
  20. Cristina Arellano & Andrew Atkeson & Mark Wright, 2016. "External and Public Debt Crises," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 191-244.
  21. McBrayer Markie & Shea Patrick E. & Kirkland Justin H., 2018. "The Financial Crisis, Fiscal Federalism, and the Creditworthiness of US State Governments," Statistics, Politics and Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-30, June.
  22. Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Fool The Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency And Sovereign Risk Premia," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(4), pages 465-487, September.
  23. Andersen, Asger Lau & Lassen, David Dreyer & Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh, 2014. "The impact of late budgets on state government borrowing costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 27-35.
  24. Asger Lau Andersen & David Dreyer Lassen & Lasse Holbøll Westh Nielsen, 2010. "The Impact of Fiscal Governance on Bond Markets: Evidence from Late Budgets and State Government Borrowing Costs," EPRU Working Paper Series 2010-11, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  25. Sounman Hong & Daniel Nadler, 2016. "The impact of political institutions on U.S. state bond yields during crises: evidence from the 2008 credit market seizure," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 77-89, March.
  26. Gootjes, Bram & de Haan, Jakob, 2022. "Do fiscal rules need budget transparency to be effective?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  27. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo Group Munich.
  28. Heiko T. Burret & Lars P. Feld, 2014. "A Note on Budget Rules and Fiscal Federalism," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(01), pages 03-11, April.
  29. Trang Hoang, 2023. "Public Pension Reform and Credit Quality of State Governments," Public Finance Review, , vol. 51(3), pages 368-431, May.
  30. John A. Dove, 2017. "Judicial Independence and US State Bond Ratings: An Empirical Investigation," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 24-46, September.
  31. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  32. Heiko T. Burret & Lars P. Feld, 2014. "A Note on Budget Rules and Fiscal Federalism," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(1), pages 03-11, 04.
  33. Clemens, Jeffrey, 2013. "State Fiscal Adjustment During Times of Stress: Possible Causes of the Severity and Composition of Budget Cuts," MPRA Paper 55921, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  34. Skip Krueger & Robert W. Walker, 2008. "Divided Government, Political Turnover, and State Bond Ratings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 259-286, May.
  35. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:1:p:19108838 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Hansen, Daniel, 2020. "The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
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