IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/ags/uwarer/270226.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Fehrler, Sebastian & Janas, Moritz, 2021. "Delegation to a Group," IZA Discussion Papers 14426, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  2. Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
  3. Andrea Mattozzi & Marcos Y. Nakaguma, 2016. "Public versus Secret Voting in Committees," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2016_29, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
  4. Herrera, Helios & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & McMurray, Joseph C., 2019. "Information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
  5. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2019. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  6. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2017. "A rationale for unanimity in committees," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-308, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  7. Yongping Bao & Ludwig Danwitz & Fabian Dvorak & Sebastian Fehrler & Lars Hornuf & Hsuan Yu Lin & Bettina von Helversen, 2022. "Similarity and Consistency in Algorithm-Guided Exploration," CESifo Working Paper Series 10188, CESifo.
  8. Ronen Gradwohl, 2018. "Voting in the limelight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 65-103, July.
  9. Lang, Matthias & Schudy, Simeon, 2023. "(Dis)honesty and the value of transparency for campaign promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
  10. S. Nageeb Ali & Roland Bénabou, 2020. "Image versus Information: Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 116-164, August.
  11. Bouton, Laurent & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Malherbe, Frédéric, 2017. "Unanimous rules in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 179-198.
  12. Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
  13. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2019. "Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 241-259.
  14. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Moumita Deb & Johannes Lohse & Rebecca McDonald, 2024. "The swing voter's curse revisited: Transparency's impact on committee voting," Discussion Papers 24-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  15. Debrah Meloso & Salvatore Nunnari & Marco Ottaviani, 2023. "Looking into Crystal Balls: A Laboratory Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(9), pages 5112-5127, September.
  16. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2019. "Mind-changes at the FOMC," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  17. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hahn, Volker, 2020. "Committee Decision-Making under the Threat of Leaks," IZA Discussion Papers 13746, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  18. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  19. Kawamura, Kohei & Vlaseros, Vasileios, 2017. "Expert information and majority decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 77-88.
  20. Keiichi Morimoto, 2021. "Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-22, May.
  21. Sebastian Fehrler & Baiba Renerte & Irenaeus Wolff, 2020. "Beliefs about Others: A Striking Example of Information Neglect," TWI Research Paper Series 118, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  22. Otto (O.H.) Swank & Bauke (B.) Visser, 2018. "Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-068/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 01 May 2019.
  23. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2021. "When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  24. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
  25. Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.
  26. Mayskaya, Tatiana & Nikandrova, Arina, 2023. "The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  27. Daniel Gibbs, 2023. "Individual accountability, collective decision-making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 524-552, December.
  28. Alessandro RIBONI & Francisco RUGE-MURCIA, 2018. "Deliberation in Committees : Theory and Evidence from the FOMC," Cahiers de recherche 01-2018, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  29. Sebastian Fehrler & Moritz Janas, 2021. "Delegation to a Group," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3714-3743, June.
  30. De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
  31. Yuan Liu & Hongmin Chen, 2022. "Cheap‐talk advertising, product experience, and reputation concern," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 3165-3175, October.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.