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The Effective Tax Burden of Companies and on Highly Skilled Manpower: Tax Policy Strategies in a Globalized Economy

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  • Elschner, Christina
  • Lammersen, Lothar
  • Overesch, Michael
  • Schwager, Robert

Abstract

Company taxes and taxes on highly skilled labour both influence the attractiveness of a particular region as a location for investment. We measure the effective tax burden on capital investment and on highly qualified labour in 33 locations across Europe and the United States. We then correlate both types of tax burden in order to study the different tax policy strategies applied in different countries. We identify three causes for different strategies: political institutions, preferences for redistribution and equality, and the position in globalisation and growth. Small countries, high growth rates, and federal structure with high tax autonomy stand for countries with lower tax burdens, especially on companies. Large countries, representative democracies with coalitions, and a high preference for redistribution are likely to induce higher tax burdens.

Suggested Citation

  • Elschner, Christina & Lammersen, Lothar & Overesch, Michael & Schwager, Robert, 2005. "The Effective Tax Burden of Companies and on Highly Skilled Manpower: Tax Policy Strategies in a Globalized Economy," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-31, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:3186
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Overesch, 2005. "The Effective Tax Burden of Companies in Europe," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(4), pages 56-63, 01.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    effective tax burden; tax policy; company taxation; personal income tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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