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GPD-linked Bonds as a Financing Tool for Developing Countries and Emerging Markets

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  • Schröder, Michael
  • Heinemann, Friedrich
  • Kruse, Susanne
  • Meitner, Matthias

Abstract

The paper examines the applicability of GDP-linked bonds for the financing of developing countries and emerging markets. GDP-linked bonds are bonds of which the coupon and/or redemption payments are tied to the GDP of the issuing country. The study encompasses a detailed empirical analysis of their pricing behaviour, the pricing sensitivities to changes in GDP, and of their behaviour in a portfolio context is conducted. A survey amongst potential investors as well as issuing-side capital market participants assesses the prospects of success of this new type of bond. Finally, the usefulness of a partial public guarantee of payments is examined. The paper provides evidence under which circumstances, for which investors and for which countries GDP-linked bonds might be an appropriate investment vehicle.

Suggested Citation

  • Schröder, Michael & Heinemann, Friedrich & Kruse, Susanne & Meitner, Matthias, 2004. "GPD-linked Bonds as a Financing Tool for Developing Countries and Emerging Markets," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-64, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2353
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mr. Robert T Price, 1997. "The Rationale and Design of Inflation-Indexed Bonds," IMF Working Papers 1997/012, International Monetary Fund.
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    3. World Bank, 2003. "The World Bank Annual Report 2003," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13930, December.
    4. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The case for GDP-indexed bonds [‘World income components: measuring and exploiting risk-sharing opportunities’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 19(38), pages 166-216.
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    7. Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Ms. Isabel Schnabel, 2002. "Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test," IMF Working Papers 2002/181, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Ludger Schuknecht, 1996. "Political Business Cycles and Fiscal Policies in Developing Countries," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 155-170, May.
    9. Mr. Eduardo Borensztein & Mr. Paolo Mauro, 2002. "Reviving the Case for GDP-Indexed Bonds," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 2002/010, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Mr. Steven T Phillips & Mr. Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 2000/168, International Monetary Fund.
    11. World Bank, 2003. "The World Bank Annual Report 2003," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13929, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Diaw, Abdou & Bacha, Obiyathulla Ismath & Lahsasna, Ahcene, 2011. "Public Sector Funding and Debt Management: A Case for GDP-Linked Sukuk," MPRA Paper 46008, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
    2. José Ramón Martínez-Resano, 2005. "Size and heterogeneity matter. A microstructure-based analysis of regulation of secondary markets for governments bonds," Occasional Papers 0501, Banco de España.
    3. Biswa Nath Bhattacharyay, 2010. "Financing Asia’s Infrastructure : Modes of Development and Integration of Asian Financial Markets," Finance Working Papers 21883, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    4. J.Ramon Martinez-Resano, 2005. "Size And Heterogeneity Matter. A Microstructure-Based Analysis Of Regulation Of Secondary Markets For Government Bonds," Finance 0508007, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    GDP-linked bonds; bonds; development finance; public finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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