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Maßnahmen zur Kontrolle von Korruption: Eine modelltheoretische Untersuchung

  • Kretschmer, Anne
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    Korruption ist kein Phänomen, das der Vergangenheit angehört oder das irgendwo auftritt, nicht aber in entwickelten Volkswirtschaften. Korruptionsfälle in Politik und Wirtschaft oder zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft haben hohe Aktualität. Auch in Deutschland beschäftigen sie Öffentlichkeit und Justizbehörden. Sie sind mit einzel- und volkswirtschaftlichen Schäden, mit Vertrauensverlust und mit Verteilungswirkungen verbunden. Die Analyse von Korruption wird daher zurecht als eine Thematik gesehen, mit der sich Ökonomen zu befassen haben: die Offenlegung des Umfeldes, das Anreize für Korruption enthält, die Erforschung der Kalküle der korrupten Akteure, die Wirkungen von Korruption und Maßnahmen zu ihrer Verhinderung sowie die Kosten der Korruptionskontrolle. Die beiden letzten Aspekte stehen im Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Arbeit. In einer modelltheoretischen Analyse wird eine optimale Kontrollstrategie hergeleitet, die eine effiziente Korruptionsbekämpfung ermöglicht. In Übereinstimmung mit der Literatur wird davon ausgegangen, dass mangelnde Kontrolle Korruption letztlich verursacht, zumindest aber ermöglicht. Die Vorbereitung, Vereinbarung und Abwicklung von Korruption ist einzelwirtschaftlich mit Kosten verbunden. Es geht also darum, diese Transaktionskosten zu erhöhen, um Korruption zu vermeiden. Dabei ist zwischen Maßnahmen und Kosten der inneren und der äußeren Kontrolle zu differenzieren. Innere Kontrolle stellt auf die moralischen Kosten der Korruption und äußere Kontrolle auf organisatorische Vorkehrungen innerhalb von Unternehmen und Behörden ab. Frau Kretschmer hat eine Arbeit vorgelegt, die der Grundlagenforschung zuzuordnen ist. Sie hat in einem klaren Modellrahmen konsistent herausgearbeitet, weshalb und wie diverse Maßnahmen der Kontrolle, Anreize zur Korruption verringern oder abbauen kann. Nun geht es darum, auf dieser Basis die Ergebnisse für konkrete Fälle und Situationen zu operationalisieren und in klare Strategien umzusetzen.

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    Paper provided by Westfälsche Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU), Institut für Genossenschaftswesen in its series Arbeitspapiere with number 25.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:25
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