IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/vfsc23/277695.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategic Choice of Price-Setting Algorithms

Author

Listed:
  • Buchali, Katrin
  • Grüb, Jens
  • Muijs, Matthias
  • Schwalbe, Ulrich

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Buchali, Katrin & Grüb, Jens & Muijs, Matthias & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2023. "Strategic Choice of Price-Setting Algorithms," VfS Annual Conference 2023 (Regensburg): Growth and the "sociale Frage" 277695, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277695
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/277695/1/vfs-2023-pid-87327.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emilio Calvano & Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò & Sergio Pastorello, 2020. "Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3267-3297, October.
    2. Timo Klein, 2021. "Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q‐learning under sequential pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 538-558, September.
    3. Ran Zhuo, 2017. "Do Low†Price Guarantees Guarantee Low Prices? Evidence from Competition between Amazon and Big†Box Stores," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(4), pages 719-738, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Buchali, Katrin & Grüb, Jens & Muijs, Matthias & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2023. "Strategic choice of price-setting algorithms," Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences 01-2023, University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences.
    2. Justin P. Johnson & Andrew Rhodes & Matthijs Wildenbeest, 2023. "Platform Design When Sellers Use Pricing Algorithms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(5), pages 1841-1879, September.
    3. Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran & Natalie Collina & Sampath Kannan & Aaron Roth & Juba Ziani, 2024. "Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats," Papers 2409.03956, arXiv.org.
    4. Esmaeili Aliabadi, Danial & Chan, Katrina, 2022. "The emerging threat of artificial intelligence on competition in liberalized electricity markets: A deep Q-network approach," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 325(C).
    5. Fourberg, Niklas & Marques-Magalhaes, Katrin & Wiewiorra, Lukas, 2022. "They are among us: Pricing behavior of algorithms in the field," WIK Working Papers 6, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH, Bad Honnef.
    6. Normann, Hans-Theo & Sternberg, Martin, 2023. "Human-algorithm interaction: Algorithmic pricing in hybrid laboratory markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    7. Colombo, Stefano & Filippini, Luigi & Pignataro, Aldo, 2024. "Information sharing, personalized pricing, and collusion," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    8. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0295, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    9. Simon Martin & Alexander Rasch, 2022. "Collusion by Algorithm: The Role of Unobserved Actions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9629, CESifo.
    10. Qian Qi, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Dual Contract," Papers 2303.12350, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    11. Fourberg, Niklas & Marques Magalhaes, Katrin & Wiewiorra, Lukas, 2023. "They Are Among Us: Pricing Behavior of Algorithms in the Field," 32nd European Regional ITS Conference, Madrid 2023: Realising the digital decade in the European Union – Easier said than done? 277958, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    12. Shidi Deng & Maximilian Schiffer & Martin Bichler, 2024. "Algorithmic Collusion in Dynamic Pricing with Deep Reinforcement Learning," Papers 2406.02437, arXiv.org.
    13. Bingyan Han, 2022. "Can maker-taker fees prevent algorithmic cooperation in market making?," Papers 2211.00496, arXiv.org.
    14. Martin, Simon & Rasch, Alexander, 2024. "Demand forecasting, signal precision, and collusion with hidden actions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    15. Gonzalo Ballestero, 2021. "Collusion and Artificial Intelligence: A computational experiment with sequential pricing algorithms under stochastic costs," Young Researchers Working Papers 1, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2022.
    16. Jason D. Hartline & Sheng Long & Chenhao Zhang, 2024. "Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion," Papers 2401.15794, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.
    17. Martino Banchio & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2022. "Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Artificial Intelligence, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Gonzalo Ballestero, 2022. "Collusion and Artificial Intelligence: A Computational Experiment with Sequential Pricing Algorithms under Stochastic Costs," Working Papers 118, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    19. Leonardo Madio & Aldo Pignataro, 2022. "Collusion Sustainability with a Capacity Constrained Firm," CESifo Working Paper Series 10170, CESifo.
    20. Calvano, Emilio & Calzolari, Giacomo & Denicolò, Vincenzo & Pastorello, Sergio, 2023. "Algorithmic collusion: Genuine or spurious?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L49 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Other

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277695. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.