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Financial Repression in General Equilibrium

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  • Scheer, Alexander
  • Müller, Gernot
  • Kriwoluzky, Alexander

Abstract

Financial repression allows governments to borrow at artificially low interest rates. Quantifying financial repression is challenging, because it relies on an estimate of the interest rate which would prevail in the absence of repression. In this paper, we put forward a quantitative business cycle model which features financial repression. We estimate the model on US times series for the period 1948-1979 in order to quantify the extent of financial repression and its impact on the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Scheer, Alexander & Müller, Gernot & Kriwoluzky, Alexander, 2017. "Financial Repression in General Equilibrium," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168301, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alejandro Justiniano & Giorgio E. Primiceri & Andrea Tambalotti, 2013. "Is There a Trade-Off between Inflation and Output Stabilization?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 1-31, April.
    2. Reinhart, C. M., 2012. "The return of financial repression," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 37-48, April.
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    5. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
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