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Negotiators' cognition: An experimental study on bilateral, integrative negotiation

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  • Reina, Livia

Abstract

Many negotiations offer a potential for integrative agreements in which the parties can maximize joint gains (through logrolling) without competing for resources as in a 0-sum game; nevertheless negotiators often fail to exploit this potential and settle for suboptimal, distributive agreements. In this study a situation of two-issues bilateral negotiation has been considered. Our aim is to get some insight on the causes that prevent negotiators from reaching integrative, Pareto-optimal agreements. We ran two experiments (one with policy makers and one with students) in which we tested the "fixed pie bias" of negotiators, and we introduced a new explanation for suboptimality, based on the hypothesis of a satisficing (not optimizing) behavior of negotiators, which leads them to a "zone of agreement bias"(ZAB).

Suggested Citation

  • Reina, Livia, 2003. "Negotiators' cognition: An experimental study on bilateral, integrative negotiation," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 05/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:0503
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bazerman, Max H. & Magliozzi, Thomas & Neale, Margaret A., 1985. "Integrative bargaining in a competitive market," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 294-313, June.
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    4. Thompson, Leigh & Hastie, Reid, 1990. "Social perception in negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 98-123, October.
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    1. Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, Marco & Reina, Livia, 2003. "Coalition formation in multilateral negotiations with a potential for logrolling: An experimental analysis of negotiators' cognition processes," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 17/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    integrative negotiation; logrolling; cognitive bias; satisficing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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