Why the rich are nastier than the poor: A note on optimal punishment
Studying evolutionarily successful behavior we show in a general framework that when individuals maximizing payoff differentials invest resources in punishing others. Interestingly, these investments are increasing in individuals, own wealth and decreasing in the wealth of others.
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- Abbink, Klaus & Bolton, Gary E. & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Tang, Fang-Fang, 2001.
"Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-25, October.
- Abbink, Klaus & Gary Bolton & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Fang-Fang Tang, 1996. "Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," Discussion Paper Serie B 381, University of Bonn, Germany.
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- J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, "undated". "Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets," J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers _124, University of California at Berkeley, Economics Department.
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