IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/rwirep/341633.html

Prices or bans: Understanding public preferences over policy options

Author

Listed:
  • Andor, Mark Andreas
  • Eßer, Jana
  • Lange, Andreas
  • Matejko, Leonie
  • Price, Michael Keith
  • Tomberg, Lukas

Abstract

When a policy goal is set or mandated, e.g., by a higher level of governance, policymakers have a range of instruments to choose from to reach this goal, such as pricing instruments or bans. However, implementation of such policies may fail when they lack public support. We thus study the determinants of public preferences for these instruments in two contexts using a survey experiment with more than 4,000 participants from the general German population. Respondents choose between pricing instruments and bans aimed towards the goals of reducing car traffic in city centers and sugar consumption, while we vary the price of the pricing instru- ment via the newly introduced Policy Price List. In addition, we vary the stringency of the ban, and information about policy effectiveness. We find that preferences over the presented policy options are sensitive to policy design for a large majority of respondents. Higher prices can both increase and decrease support for pricing, while more stringent bans are not necessarily less popular. In addition, perceived policy effectiveness matters: providing information about effectiveness increases support for the pricing instrument. By contrast, moral convictions and trait reactance primarily predict support for the policy goal itself rather than relative policy preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Andor, Mark Andreas & Eßer, Jana & Lange, Andreas & Matejko, Leonie & Price, Michael Keith & Tomberg, Lukas, 2026. "Prices or bans: Understanding public preferences over policy options," Ruhr Economic Papers 1210, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:341633
    DOI: 10.4419/96973395
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/341633/1/1973377039.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.4419/96973395?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:341633. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rwiesde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.