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Glas halb voll oder halb leer? Eine Analyse der Qualifikation von Kontrollorganmitgliedern deutscher Banken

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  • Körner, Tobias
  • Müller, Oliver
  • Paul, Stephan
  • Schmidt, Christoph M.

Abstract

Die bislang umfangreichste empirische Studie zur Kompetenz von Aufsichts- und Verwaltungsräten deutscher Banken zeigt: Der allgemeine Ausbildungsstand von Mitgliedern in den Kontrollorganen von Sparkassen, Genossenschaftsbanken und Privatbanken ist zwar hoch. Außer den Arbeitnehmer-Vertretern verfügen jedoch wenige Kontrolleure über branchenspezifische Fachkompetenz. Dieser Befund trifft überraschenderweise in besonderem Maße für die Vorsitzenden der Gremien zu. Allerdings besitzen diese eine im Vergleich zu den übrigen Mitgliedern stärker ausgeprägte Führungserfahrung. Insgesamt hängt das Qualifikationsniveau von der Rechtsform und Größe sowie dem Geschäftsmodell der Banken ab.

Suggested Citation

  • Körner, Tobias & Müller, Oliver & Paul, Stephan & Schmidt, Christoph M., 2014. "Glas halb voll oder halb leer? Eine Analyse der Qualifikation von Kontrollorganmitgliedern deutscher Banken," RWI Materialien 78, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwimat:78
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    3. Böhm, C. & Froneberg, Dennis & Schiereck, Dirk, 2012. "Zum offensichtlich erkennbaren bankwirtschaftlichen Sachverstand in den Kontrollorganen deutscher Genossenschaftsbanken und Sparkassen," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 59845, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
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