IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/qucehw/315744.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The perils of technocratic power: Central bank discretion and the end of bretton woods revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Sahasrabuddhe, Aditi
  • Seddon, Jack

Abstract

Recent crises have cast doubt on the legitimacy of technocratic power, yet its role in global economic governance remains poorly understood. Revisiting the collapse of Bretton Woods, we propose a dynamic theory of global monetary governance to explain how expanding central bank discretion can destabilize systems. While most studies attribute the postwar system's failure to geopolitical struggles, institutional weaknesses, or shifting economic ideas, they overlook the policies designed to manage and stabilize it. Drawing on historical institutionalism, we show how coordination tensions between rule-bound and discretionary policymakers-and the mutually reinforcing adaptation risks they faced-produced responses that appeared stabilizing in the short term but ultimately eroded long-run stability. New archival evidence from the IMF, BIS, and OECD reveals how tools like the London Gold Pool and currency swap lines extended central bank power, concealed macroeconomic imbalances, and crowded out political momentum for structural reform. As technocratic authority grew misaligned with political support and functional economic adjustment, it became a liability. This challenges the dominant view that technocratic actors are inherently superior in managing global economic policy

Suggested Citation

  • Sahasrabuddhe, Aditi & Seddon, Jack, 2025. "The perils of technocratic power: Central bank discretion and the end of bretton woods revisited," QUCEH Working Paper Series 25-06, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:qucehw:315744
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/315744/1/1923350935.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McDowell, Daniel, 2017. "Brother, Can You Spare a Billion?: The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780190605766, Decembrie.
    2. Toniolo,Gianni Assisted by-Name:Clement,Piet, 2007. "Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930–1973," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521043700, Enero-Abr.
    3. Farrell, Henry & Newman, Abraham L., 2021. "The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 333-358, February.
    4. Garrett, John R., 1995. "Monetary Policy and Expectations: Market-Control Techniques and the Bank of England, 1925–1931," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 612-636, September.
    5. Tim Büthe & Walter Mattli, 2011. "The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9470.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Justus Baron & Jorge Contreras & Martin Husovec & Pierre Larouche, 2019. "Making the Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights," JRC Research Reports JRC115004, Joint Research Centre.
    2. Bayer, Patrick & Marcoux, Christopher & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2013. "Leveraging private capital for climate mitigation: Evidence from the Clean Development Mechanism," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 14-24.
    3. Justo-Hanani, Ronit & Dayan, Tamar, 2014. "The role of the state in regulatory policy for nanomaterials risk: Analyzing the expansion of state-centric rulemaking in EU and US chemicals policies," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 169-178.
    4. Sandra Lavenex & Flavia Jurje, 2021. "Opening‐up labor mobility? Rising powers' rulemaking in trade agreements," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 598-615, July.
    5. Luis Fonseca & Vitor Silva & José Carlos Sá & Vanda Lima & Gilberto Santos & Rui Silva, 2022. "B Corp versus ISO 9001 and 14001 certifications: Aligned, or alternative paths, towards sustainable development?," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(3), pages 496-508, May.
    6. Wijkström, Erik & McDaniels, Devin, 2013. "International standards and the WTO TBT Agreement: Improving governance for regulatory alignment," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2013-06, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    7. Hanna Hilbrandt & Monika Grubbauer, 2020. "Standards and SSOs in the contested widening and deepening of financial markets: The arrival of Green Municipal Bonds in Mexico City," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 52(7), pages 1415-1433, October.
    8. Janina Grabs & Graeme Auld & Benjamin Cashore, 2021. "Private regulation, public policy, and the perils of adverse ontological selection," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1183-1208, October.
    9. Alain Naef, 2021. "Dirty float or clean intervention? The Bank of England in the foreign exchange market," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 25(1), pages 180-201.
    10. Tim Legrand & Diane Stone, 2021. "Governing global policy: what IPE can learn from public policy? [Review article: What is policy convergence and what causes it?]," Policy and Society, Darryl S. Jarvis and M. Ramesh, vol. 40(4), pages 484-501.
    11. Bronk, Richard & Jacoby, Wade, 2016. "Uncertainty and the dangers of monocultures in regulation, analysis, and practice," MPIfG Discussion Paper 16/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    12. van der Ven, Hamish & Sun, Yixian & Cashore, Benjamin, 2021. "Sustainable commodity governance and the global south," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    13. Daniel Mügge & Bart Stellinga, 2015. "The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(1), pages 47-62, March.
    14. Christoph Knill & Louisa Bayerlein & Jan Enkler & Stephan Grohs, 2019. "Bureaucratic influence and administrative styles in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-106, March.
    15. Blancheton, Bertrand, 2016. "Central bank independence in a historical perspective. Myth, lessons and a new model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 101-107.
    16. Anne Mione, 2015. "The value of intangibles in a situation of innovation: questions raised by the case of standards," Post-Print hal-01988676, HAL.
    17. Michael D. Bordo & Robert N. McCauley, 2019. "Triffin: Dilemma or Myth?," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 67(4), pages 824-851, December.
    18. FabianG. Neuner, 2020. "Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of Global Private EnvironmentalGovernance," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 20(1), pages 60-81, February.
    19. Daniel McDowell, 2019. "The (Ineffective) Financial Statecraft of China's Bilateral Swap Agreements," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 50(1), pages 122-143, January.
    20. Jessica F. Green, 2018. "Transnational delegation in global environmental governance: When do non‐state actors govern?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(2), pages 263-276, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bretton Woods; London Gold Pool; monetary history; monetary governance; historical institutionalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:qucehw:315744. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/chqubuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.