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Die ökonomischen Nobelpreisträger 2024: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson und James A. Robinson

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  • Pies, Ingo

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag erläutert die Forschungsbeiträge, für die Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson und James A. Robinson im Jahr 2024 mit dem Nobel-Gedächtnispreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften ausgezeichnet wurden. Gewürdigt werden erstens ihre empirischen Untersuchungen zur Unterscheidung zwischen inklusiven und extraktiven Institutionen mitsamt ihren Auswirkungen auf den wirtschaftlichen Wohlstand sowie zweitens ihr theoretischer Interpretationsrahmen für die polit-ökonomische Logik institutionellen Wandels.

Suggested Citation

  • Pies, Ingo, 2024. "Die ökonomischen Nobelpreisträger 2024: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson und James A. Robinson," Discussion Papers 2024-05, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mlucee:307125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    2. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    3. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 115-131, February.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    5. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
    7. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "Modeling Inefficient Institutions," NBER Working Papers 11940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.
    9. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2023. "Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 407-420, May.
    10. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    11. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, June.
    12. Greif, Avner, 2000. "The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 251-284, December.
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