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Fraudulence and the competitive supply of public goods


  • Endres, Alfred


H. Demsetz claimed that under certain conditions private firms can supply public goods efficiently. Recently, it was argued that the optimality of the Demsetz equilibrium is destroyed when consumers engage in fraudulent behavior. In this paper, fraudulence is explicitly introduced in the Demsetz model. It ig shown that fraudulent consumers do no härm to the optimality of supplying public goods privately, within the framework of the Demsetz model.

Suggested Citation

  • Endres, Alfred, 1978. "Fraudulence and the competitive supply of public goods," Discussion Papers, Series B 1, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondpb:1

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Joe R. Hulett & Robert B. Eke Lund Jr. & W. Mark Crain, 1976. "The Private Provision of Public Goods: A Note on the Demsetz Model," Public Finance Review, , vol. 4(1), pages 45-55, January.
    2. Demsetz, Harold, 1970. "The Private Production of Public Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 293-306, October.
    3. Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "Joint Supply and Price Discrimination," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 389-405, October.
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