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The future of the IMF: how to prevent the next global financial crisis

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  • Siebert, Horst

Abstract

The paper analyzes how the next financial crisis can be prevented and which role the IMF should play. The paper distinguishes between the improvement of existing instruments and solving the moral hazard problem. Both issues are interrelated. The size of operation of the IMF creates a moral hazard problem. The IMF should credibly announce the ex-post rules for bridging a liquidity gap in order to set the right ex-ante incentives for the behavior of debtors and creditors. An institutional design for dealing with private and sovereign debt analogous to national bankruptcy rules has to be developed.

Suggested Citation

  • Siebert, Horst, 1998. "The future of the IMF: how to prevent the next global financial crisis," Kiel Working Papers 870, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:870
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/1026/1/247314935.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:wbk:wbpubs:5980 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Allan H. Meltzer, 1998. "Asian Problems and the IMF," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 17(3), pages 264-274, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nunnenkamp, Peter, 1999. "The moral hazard of IMF lending: Making a fuss about a minor problem?," Kiel Discussion Papers 332, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    2. Golder, Stefan M., 1999. "Precautionary credit lines: A means to contain contagion in financial markets?," Kiel Discussion Papers 341, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    3. Diehl, Markus & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 2001. "Lehren aus der Asienkrise: wirtschaftspolitische Reaktionen und fortbestehende Reformdefizite," Kiel Discussion Papers 373, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    4. Siebert, Horst, 1999. "Improving the world's financial architecture: The role of the IMF," Kiel Discussion Papers 351, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F00 - International Economics - - General - - - General
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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