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Zur Konsistenz und Glaubwürdigkeit von Wirtschaftsreformen: Einige Erfahrungen und Lehren für die Systemtransformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa

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  • Nunnenkamp, Peter
  • Schmieding, Holger

Abstract

Nach der anfänglichen Euphorie über die Demokratisierung und wirtschaftliche Öffnung mittel- und osteuropäischer Staaten dominieren nun die negativen Meldungen über Stockungen des eingeleiteten Transformationsprozesses. Die Erfahrungen der Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer zeigen, daß Reformprogramme insbesondere an mangelnder Glaubwürdigkeit und an Inkonsistenzen zwischen den Elementen makroökonomische Stabilisierung, binnenwirtschaftliche Deregulierung, außenwirtschaftliche Liberalisierung und Privatisierung von Staatsbetrieben zu scheitern drohen. Der Erfolg von Wirtschaftsreformen hängt maßgeblich davon ab, ob es gelingt, die Ansprüche von Interessengruppen an das Staatsbudget zurückzudrängen, monopolistische Preiserhöhungsspielräume einzugrenzen und die Anreize von Betrieben und Banken, einzelwirtschaftliche Kosten und Risiken auf den Staat abzuwälzen, abzuschaffen. Makroökonomische Stabilisierungsprogramme allein reichen nicht aus, den Handlungsspielraum der Regierung dauerhaft wiederherzustellen. Die Leistungsfähigkeit von Volkswirtschaften kann auch durch mikroökonomische Liberalisierung nicht nachhaltig erhöht werden, solange die Anreize zu einem nicht marktgerechten Verhalten nicht umfassend bekämpft werden. Zur Schaffung von Konkurrenzbedingungen muß sowohl der inländische Wettbewerb stimuliert als auch der Schutz vor ausländischer Konkurrenz zügig abgebaut werden. Anpassungskrisen lassen sich nach grundlegenden Änderungen der Wirtschaftspolitik kaum vermeiden. Um die hierdurch verursachten Kosten einzugrenzen, den Reformwiderstand zu brechen und die Gefahr der Umkehrbarkeit des eingeschlagenen Kurses zu verringern, sollten die wesentlichen Reformschritte mehr oder weniger gleichzeitig eingeleitet werden. • Eine schnelle Privatisierung kann die Glaubwürdigkeit der Systemtransformation stärken, die Reagibilität des Angebots auf Marktsignale erhöhen und die Anpassungskrise abmildern und verkürzen. Ausländische Investoren sollten sich an der Privatisierung von Anfang an beteiligen können, um die Kapitalzufuhr anzuregen und die Übernahme neuer Technologien zu erleichtern. Auf jeden Fall gilt es, unverzüglich Rechtssicherheit herzustellen, gesetzliche Hindernisse für die Gründung und Expansion neuer Privatbetriebe sofort abzuschaffen und privat nutzbare Gewerbeflächen bereitzustellen.

Suggested Citation

  • Nunnenkamp, Peter & Schmieding, Holger, 1991. "Zur Konsistenz und Glaubwürdigkeit von Wirtschaftsreformen: Einige Erfahrungen und Lehren für die Systemtransformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa," Kiel Discussion Papers 166, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkdp:166
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    1. Schweickert, Rainer & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Hiemenz, Ulrich, 1992. "Stabilisierung durch feste Wechselkurse: Fehlschlag in Entwicklungsländern - Erfolgsrezept für Osteuropa?," Kiel Discussion Papers 181, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Funke, Norbert, 1993. "Timing and sequencing of reforms: Competing views," Kiel Working Papers 552, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Raiser, Martin & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 1993. "Output decline and recovery in Central Europe: the role of incentives before, during and after privatisation," Kiel Working Papers 601, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Nunnenkamp, Peter, 1993. "The return of foreign capital to Latin America: good news from the reform front or a case for policy intervention?," Kiel Working Papers 574, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Siebert, Horst & Schmieding, Holger & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 1991. "The transformation of a socialist economy: lessons of German unification," Kiel Working Papers 469, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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