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Adverse selection, learning, and competitive search

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  • Mayr-Dorn, Karin

Abstract

I develop a dynamic version of the competitive search model with adverse selection in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010). My model allows for an analysis of the effects of firm learning on labor market efficiency in the presence of search frictions. I find that firm learning increases relative expected earnings in high-ability jobs and, thereby, enhances imitation incentives of low-ability workers. The net effect on the aggregate expected match surplus and unemployment is indeterminate a priori. Numerical results show that firm learning does not increase labor market efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Mayr-Dorn, Karin, 2020. "Adverse selection, learning, and competitive search," GLO Discussion Paper Series 700, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:700
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2010. "Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1823-1862, November.
    2. Francisco M. Gonzalez & Shouyong Shi, 2010. "An Equilibrium Theory of Learning, Search, and Wages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 509-537, March.
    3. Lisa B. Kahn, 2013. "Asymmetric Information between Employers," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 165-205, October.
    4. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    job search; on-the-job effort; asymmetric information; learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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