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Excessive Competition on Headline Prices

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  • Inderst, Roman
  • Obradovits, Martin

Abstract

In a variety of purchasing situations, consumers may focus primarily on headline prices, ignoring the full costs associated with acquiring and maintaining a product or service contract. Even when this is the case, it is widely believed that intense competition would adequately protect consumers (the so-called "waterbed effect"). However, in a tractable model of imperfect competition and vertical differentiation, we show that when consumers exhibit context-dependent preferences, competition may rather exacerbate their and society's harm. Then, consumer protection policy must sufficiently constrain hidden costs and fees so that competition, along with high-quality firms' incentives to educate consumers, can restore efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Inderst, Roman & Obradovits, Martin, 2021. "Excessive Competition on Headline Prices," EconStor Preprints 253666, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:253666
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Célérier, Claire & Vallée, Boris, 2016. "Catering to investors through product complexity," ESRB Working Paper Series 14, European Systemic Risk Board.
    2. Ghosh, Meenakshi, 2022. "A Note on the Regulation of Add-ons," MPRA Paper 113549, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ghosh, Meenakshi, 2021. "Consumer naivete and competitive add-on pricing on platforms," MPRA Paper 109981, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Köster, Mats, 2020. "Attention to online sales: The role of brand image concerns," DICE Discussion Papers 335, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    5. Markus Dertwinkel‐Kalt & Mats Köster, 2022. "Attention to online sales: The role of brand image concerns," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 64-89, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    shrouded charges; hidden fees; price competition; shopping; salience; unshrouding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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