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Funktionen und Schutz von "property rights": Eine ökonomische Analyse

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  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

Dieses Paper untersucht "property rights" im Stile der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts. Dabei wird der Zusammenhang zwischen "property rights" und Allokationseffizienz ebenso behandelt wie der Schutz von "property rights" durch Unterlassungs- und Schadenersatzansprüche, durch Haftungsregeln und Strafrecht. Daneben wird auf Fälle des Marktversagens (Monopol, externe Effekte, öffentliche Güter und gemeinschaftlich nutzbare Ressourcen) und Abschwächungen der "property rights" durch Enteignung und Regulierung eingegangen.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1998. "Funktionen und Schutz von "property rights": Eine ökonomische Analyse," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 98-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9804
    as

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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23100/1/9804prop.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1993. "Time, uncertainty, and subjectivism: Giving more body to law and economics," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 61-84, March.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; allocative efficiency; liability rules; criminal law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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