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Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard

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  • Houben, Eike

Abstract

The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the entrepreneur's and venture capitalist's effort, and the signals each player has revealed about his private information regarding the project's perspectives. This property can be used to induce both players to reveal their private information truthfully and to spend the efficient effort. This result holds irrespective of the assumed distribution function of the state of nature. The model is consistent with the observation that conversion is often automatic and that there is an inverse correlation between risk and control rights. Furthermore, it explains why venture capitalists can earn positive expected returns in a competitive venture capital market.

Suggested Citation

  • Houben, Eike, 2002. "Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 556, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauman:556
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/111049/1/Manuskripte-556_Venture-Capital-Moral-Hazard.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
    2. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
    3. Gorman, Michael & Sahlman, William A., 1989. "What do venture capitalists do?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 231-248, July.
    4. Westhead, Paul & Wright, Mike, 1998. "Novice, portfolio, and serial founders: are they different?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 173-204, May.
    5. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    6. Houben, Eike & Nippel, Peter, 2001. "The role of credit rationing and collateral in debt financing," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 547, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    7. Schertler, Andrea, 2000. "Venture Capital Contracts: A Survey of the Recent Literature," Kiel Working Papers 1017, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wentao Gu & Xuzheng Qian & Junpeng Lu, 2018. "Venture capital and entrepreneurship: a conceptual model and research suggestions," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 35-50, March.
    2. Fu, Hui & Yang, Jun & An, Yunbi, 2019. "Made for each other: Perfect matching in venture capital markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 346-358.
    3. Bernile, Gennaro & Cumming, Douglas & Lyandres, Evgeny, 2007. "The size of venture capital and private equity fund portfolios," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 564-590, September.
    4. Christian Hopp & Finn Rieder, 2011. "What drives venture capital syndication?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(23), pages 3089-3102.
    5. Damiano Montani & Daniele Gervasio & Andrea Pulcini, 2020. "Startup Company Valuation: The State of Art and Future Trends," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(9), pages 1-31, September.
    6. Momtaz, Paul P., 2021. "Entrepreneurial Finance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Token Offerings," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 36(5).
    7. Guangyuan Xing & Dong Qian & Ju’e Guo, 2016. "Research on the Participant Behavior Selections of the Energy Performance Contracting Project Based on the Robustness of the Shared Savings Contract," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(8), pages 1-13, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    venture capital; moral hazard; adverse selection; signaling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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