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Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal and Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Hayley Chouinard

    () (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)

Abstract

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. The equilibria for multiple bidders and a more general value distribution are also presented

Suggested Citation

  • Hayley Chouinard, 2006. "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal and Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2006-6, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:chouinard-1
    as

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    File URL: http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/chouinard_rofr.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grosskopf, Brit & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 176-204, January.
    2. Elmar Wolfstetter & Michael Landsberger & Jakob Rubinstei & Shmuel Zamir, 1997. "First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations," Microeconomics 9701004, EconWPA.
    3. Hayley H. Chouinard, 2005. "Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(4), pages 1083-1088.
    4. Natalia Fabra, 2003. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 271-293, September.
    5. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January.
    6. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    7. Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 965-979, June.
    8. Osmundsen, Petter, 1996. "Repeated Auctions of Franchises for Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 183-189, September.
    9. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chouinard Hayley H & Yoder Jonathan K, 2007. "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-15, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    repeated auction; right of first refusal; asymmetric information;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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