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Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts

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  • Hayley H. Chouinard

Abstract

The National Park Service has struggled to improve the quality of service provided by concessioners for decades. To address these concerns, the Park Service eliminated the right of first refusal from the largest revenue-generating concession contract auctions beginning in 2000. This article provides models of concession contract auctions with and without the right of first refusal. The optimal bidding strategies and expected level of service are found. The results confirm the auction without the right of first refusal leads to bids that include a higher level of service. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Hayley H. Chouinard, 2005. "Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(4), pages 1083-1088.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:87:y:2005:i:4:p:1083-1088
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2005.00795.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Chouinard Hayley H & Yoder Jonathan K, 2007. "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, pages 1-15.
    2. Martin F. Quaas & Ralph Winkler, 2017. "A Market Mechanism for Sustainable and Efficient Resource Use under Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 6524, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Karine Brisset & François Cochard & François Maréchal, 2012. "The Value of a Right of First Refusal Clause in a Procurement First-Price Auction," Working Papers 2012-03, CRESE.
    4. Karine Brisset & François Cochard & François Maréchal, 2015. "Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a Right-of-First-Refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental Evidence," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(4), pages 639-665, April.
    5. Hayley Chouinard, 2006. "Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal and Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2006-6, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

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