Preference Variation and Private Donations
This paper tries to bridge part of the gap between the theoretical model of mixed altruism and the empirical research on charitable behaviour. We use questionnaire data on charitable donations from a representative sample of the Flemish population. We link interindividual differences in behaviour to the answers on direct motivational questions. The results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Respondents who are more sensitive to warm glow considerations donate more. A stronger preference for the public good does not lead to a higher level of private giving. This can be seen as weak evidence for the crowding out-effect. Tax prices have no significant effect. This has mainly to do with lack of information and limited tax awareness.
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