Das oeffentliche Auftragswesen im gesamtwirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang
This paper, written in German language, deals with public procurement policies in the European Union in an overall economic context. Public sector contracts for goods and services make up about one sixth of Community GDP. Governments of all levels tend to rely on local firms when extenting delivery contracts. This may be in conflict with the rules of the EU internal market which, for larger contracts, request competition among bidders. The current essay discusses the possible tensions between competition in the market and the regulation of public procurement. Public contracts have been used to implement additional policy goals, such as social and environmental aspects or to aid small business. The latter goal is often blurred by the tendency to centralise procurement in order to increase the market power of public demand. In general, such a mix of goals may reduce the efficiency of procurement policy.
|Date of creation:||19 Jul 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33. 33 pages, written in German|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barro, Robert J, 1990.
"Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S103-26, October.
- Robert J. Barro, 1988. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," NBER Working Papers 2588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, R.J., 1988. "Government Spending In A Simple Model Of Endogenous Growth," RCER Working Papers 130, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Barro, Robert J., 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogeneous Growth," Scholarly Articles 3451296, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Federico Trionfetti, 2000. "Discriminatory Public Procurement and International Trade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 57-76, 01.
- Philippe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2002.
"Competition and innovation: an inverted U relationship,"
IFS Working Papers
W02/04, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Philippe Aghion & Nick Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2005. "Competition and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(2), pages 701-728.
- Philippe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2002. "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship," NBER Working Papers 9269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Howitt, Peter & Griffith, Rachel & Aghion, Philippe & Blundell, Richard & Bloom, Nick, 2005. "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship," Scholarly Articles 4481507, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Denis Audet, 2002. "Government procurement: A synthesis report," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 2(3), pages 149-194.
- Handler, Heinz & Burger, Christina, 2002. "Competition and competitiveness in a new economy," MPRA Paper 44944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Francois, Joseph & Nelson, Doug R & Palmeter, David, 1996. "Public Procurement: A Post-Uruguay Round Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1412, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0507012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.