Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh In On Copyright: The Role Of Theory, Empirics, And Network Effects
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- George Baker, 2000. "The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 415-420.
- Canice Prendergast, 2000. "What Trade-Off of Risk and Incentives?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 421-425.
- W. Robert Reed & Cynthia L. Rogers, 2006.
"Tax Burden and the Mismeasurement of State Tax Policy,"
Public Finance Review,
, vol. 34(4), pages 404-426, July.
- maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, EconWPA.
- Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997.
"Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
- Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 134-139.
- Eric Helland, 1998. "The Enforcement Of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, And Self-Reporting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, pages 141-153.
- Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring.
- George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, pages 45-76.
- Tybout, James, 1998. "Manufacuring firms in developing countries - how well do they do, and why?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1965, The World Bank.
- James Tybout, 1998. "Manufacturing Firms In Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, And Why?," Development and Comp Systems 9805004, EconWPA.
- James Tybout, 1999. "Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?," Development and Comp Systems 9906001, EconWPA, revised 10 Jun 1999.
- Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
- Epple, Dennis & Visscher, Michael, 1984. "Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 29-60, April.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 45-76.
- Montserrat Grau & Theodore Groves, 1997. "The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 315-339.
- Ronald A. Dye, 1986. "Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 339-350.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994.
"Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1991. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," NBER Working Papers 3822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kim Jin-Hyuk, 2007.
"Strategic Use of Copyright Protection to Deter Entry,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
De Gruyter, pages 1-19.
- Kim, Jin-Hyuk, 2007. "Strategic Use of Copyright Protection to Deter Entry," MPRA Paper 51397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Baker, Matthew J & Cunningham, Brendan M, 2006.
"Court Decisions and Equity Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 567-596, October.
- Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M. Cunningham, 2004. "Court Decisions and Equity Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection," Departmental Working Papers 4, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- Handke, Christian & Girard, Yann & Mattes, Anselm, 2015. "Fördert das Urheberrecht Innovation? Eine empirische Untersuchung," Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem 16-2015, Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation (EFI) - Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, Berlin.
- Olivier P. Bomsel, 2013.
"Copyright And Brands In The Digital Age: Internalizing The Externalities Of Meaning,"
Contemporary Economic Policy,
Western Economic Association International, pages 126-134.
- Olivier Bomsel, 2013. "Copyright and brands in the digital age: Internalizing the externalities of meaning," Post-Print hal-00498365, HAL.
- Dobusch, Leonhard & Quack, Sigrid, 2010. "Urheberrecht zwischen Kreativität und Verwertung: Transnationale Mobilisierung und private Regulierung," MPIfG Discussion Paper 10/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
- repec:kap:ejlwec:v:43:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-016-9538-z is not listed on IDEAS
- Ivan Png, 2006. "Copyright: A Plea for Empirical Research," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000484, David K. Levine.
- Paul J. Heald, 2014. "The public domain," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Copyright, chapter 5, pages 93-104 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Peter Lewin, 2007. "Creativity or Coercion: Alternative Perspectives on Rights to Intellectual Property," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, pages 441-455.
- Noemí Pulido Pavón & Luis Palma Martos & Luis F. Aguado, 2016. "Derechos de autor. Enfoque económico, evolución y perspectivas," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 18(35), pages 151-169, July-Dece.
- Ivan Png & Qiu-hong Wang, 2007. "Copyright Duration and the Supply of Creative Work," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000478, David K. Levine.
- Yasuhiro Arai & Shinya Kinukawa, 2014. "Copyright infringement as user innovation," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, pages 131-144.
- Nodir Adilov & Michael Waldman, 2013.
"Optimal Copyright Length And Ex Post Investment: A Mickey Mouse Approach,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1101-1122, April.
- Adilov, Nodir & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "Optimal copyright length and ex post investment: a Mickey Mouse approach," MPRA Paper 1551, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pollock, Rufus, 2008. "Forever Minus a Day? Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright Term," MPRA Paper 8887, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 May 2008.
- Pollock, Rufus, 2007. "Forever Minus a Day? Some Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright," MPRA Paper 5024, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Aug 2007.
More about this item
KeywordsEldred; coypright; sonny bono; lessig;
- K - Law and Economics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-05-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-05-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2005-05-07 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-NET-2005-05-07 (Network Economics)
- NEP-TID-2005-05-07 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0505003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: http://econwpa.repec.org .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .