Consumer Discrimination, Duopoly, and Black Firm Entry: The Welfare Effect of Subsidies
Consumer discrimination, to the extent that it discourages the entry of Black-owned firms may be welfare reducing, as market output is lower than otherwise. This paper offers a simple model of duopoly in which conditions are derived for which a profit subsidy to Black-owned firms increases, decreases, or has no effect on social welfare.
|Date of creation:||16 May 1995|
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- Arthur Fishman & Neil Gandal, 1993.
"Experimentation and Learning with Network Effects,"
- Fishman, Arthur & Gandal, Neil, 1994. "Experimentation and learning with networks effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 103-108.
- Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 2, number 9780226041162.
- Varian, Hal R., 1995. "Entry and cost reduction," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 399-410, November.
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