Consumer discrimination, duopoly, and black firm entry: The welfare effect of subsidies
Consumer discrimination, to the extent that it discourages the entry of Black-owned firms may be welfare reducing, as market output is lower than otherwise. This paper offers a simple model of duopoly in which conditions are derived for which a profit subsidy to Black-owned firms increases, decreases, or has no effect on social welfare.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 23 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12114|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fishman, Arthur & Gandal, Neil, 1994.
"Experimentation and learning with networks effects,"
Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 103-108.
- Varian, Hal R., 1995. "Entry and cost reduction," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 399-410, November.
- Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 2, number 9780226041162, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:blkpoe:v:23:y:1995:i:4:p:69-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.