Affirmative Action in Hierarchies
There is considerable evidence that males are more prone to take risks than females. This difference has implications for rates of promotion in hierarchies where promotion is based on random signals of ability. I explore the promotion consequences of three types of performance standards: gender-blind standards, standards designed to promote agents of equal ability on average, and standards designed to promote equal numbers of both genders. These three objectives lead to different promotion standards, which highlights among other things that the goal of affirmative action is not well defined. Lower promotion standards for females can be necessary to ensure either equal abilities or equal numbers in the promoted populations.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, 2008.
"Sex and Risk: Experimental Evidence,"
Monash Economics Working Papers
archive-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2008. "Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
- Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, 1987.
"Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-476.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1984. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 708R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised 1985.
- Richard Startz & Lundberg, "undated".
"Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets,"
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers
19-81, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Lundberg, Shelly J & Startz, Richard, 1983. "Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 340-347, June.
- Jianakoplos, Nancy Ammon & Bernasek, Alexandra, 1998. "Are Women More Risk Averse?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 620-630, October.
- Dekel, E. & Scotchmer, S., 1999.
"On the Evolution of Attitudes Towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games,"
4-99, Tel Aviv.
- Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1999. "On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 125-143, July.
- Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman & Nancy Lutz & V. Padmanbhan, 1997. "Playing it Safe: Men, Women, and Risk Aversion," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-42, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Harry Holzer & David Neumark, 1999.
"Assessing Affirmative Action,"
NBER Working Papers
7323, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shelly J. Lundberg, 1991. "The Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws Under Imperfect Information: Affirmative Action and Alternatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 309-326.
- Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, 2002. "Sex Differences and Statistical Stereotyping in Attitudes Toward Financial Risk," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-03, Monash University, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0303005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.