Mackerels in the Moonlight: Corrupt Politicians and Anti- Corruption Reform in Two-Candidate Elections
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordscorruption; reform; constitutional limits;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-POL-2005-07-18 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-07-18 (Regulation)
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