Behavioral Strategies in Repeated Pure Coordination Games
We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to account for the results, one postulating the formation of conventions, and the other invoking the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players. We reject both models as possible candidates to describe the behavioral regularities that we observe in the data. A third model that allows individual perturbations of commonly shared choice probabilities is proposed and tested. It accounts for the major results on the individual and aggregate levels.
|Date of creation:||19 Oct 2001|
|Note:||Type of Document - ZIP Acrobat PDF; prepared on PC; pages: 32; figures: included|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jack Ochs, 1990. "The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 545-559.
- Rapoport, Amnon & Chung Lo, Alison King & Zwick, Rami, 2002.
"Choice of Prizes Allocated by Multiple Lotteries with Endogenously Determined Probabilities,"
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 180-206, January.
- Amnon Rapoport & Alison King Chung Lo & Rami Zwick, 2001. "Choice of Prizes Allocated by Multiple Lotteries with Endogenously Determined Probabilities," Experimental 0110003, EconWPA.
- Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 2002. "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(3), pages 253-272, December.
- Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 1999. "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental 9903001, EconWPA.
- Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
- Selten,Reinhard, "undated". "Anticipatory learning in two-person games," Discussion Paper Serie B 93, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Ernan Haruvy & Dale O. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, 2001. "Modeling And Testing For Heterogeneity In Observed Strategic Behavior," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 146-157, February. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0110004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.