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Modeling And Testing For Heterogeneity In Observed Strategic Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Ernan Haruvy
  • Dale O. Stahl
  • Paul W. Wilson

Abstract

Experimental data have consistently shown diversity in beliefs as well as in actions among experimental subjects. This paper presents and compares alternative behavioral econometric models for the characterization of player heterogeneity, both between and within subpopulations of players. In particular, two econometric models of diversity within subpopulations of players are investigated, one using a model of computational errors and the other allowing for diversity in prior beliefs around a modal prior for the subpopulation. 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Suggested Citation

  • Ernan Haruvy & Dale O. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, 2001. "Modeling And Testing For Heterogeneity In Observed Strategic Behavior," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(1), pages 146-157, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:83:y:2001:i:1:p:146-157
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 2002. "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(3), pages 253-272, December.
    2. repec:eee:gamebe:v:106:y:2017:i:c:p:16-37 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Octavian Carare & Ernan Haruvy & Ashutosh Prasad, 2007. "Hierarchical thinking and learning in rank order contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 305-316, September.
    4. Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O., 2004. "Deductive versus inductive equilibrium selection: experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 319-331, March.
    5. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Step-Level Reasoning and Bidding in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1633-1642, November.
    6. Stahl, Dale O. & Haruvy, Ernan, 2008. "Level-n bounded rationality and dominated strategies in normal-form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 226-232, May.
    7. Stahl, Dale O. & Haruvy, Ernan, 2008. "Level-n bounded rationality in two-player two-stage games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-61, January.
    8. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2005. "Random belief equilibrium in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 296-323, May.
    9. Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O., 2007. "Equilibrium selection and bounded rationality in symmetric normal-form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 98-119, January.
    10. Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport & Alison King Chung Lo, 2001. "Behavioral Strategies in Repeated Pure Coordination Games," Experimental 0110004, EconWPA.
    11. Ernan Haruvy & Dale Stahl, 2004. "Level-n Bounded Rationality on a Level Playing Field of Sequential Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 126, Econometric Society.
    12. Klaus Moeltner & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund & Maria Alejandra Velez, 2007. "Processing Data from Social Dilemma Experiments: A Bayesian Comparison of Parametric Estimators," Working Papers 07-013, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
    13. Glenn Harrison & E. Rutström, 2009. "Expected utility theory and prospect theory: one wedding and a decent funeral," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 133-158, June.

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