L'actionnaire minoritaire, le commissaire, l'avocat et le juge : histoire d'une fusion litigieuse
The case of a French merger can be used to better understand the nature of conflicts of interest and cognitive conflicts between accountants, shareholders, lawyers and judges. This is especially the case when exchange ratios are unfairly established. When caught in a situation of asymmetrical information, minority shareholders try to obtain more information about the auditors' report through a trial. The financial knowledge possessed by the judge then becomes a necessary condition if shareholders are to be protected.
|Date of creation:||24 Mar 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; pages: 24. in « L’entreprise, le chiffre et le droit », éditeurs J.G. Degos et S. Trébucq, Bordeaux (2005), pp. 385-407.|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hay, Bruce L, 1995. "Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 29-62, January.
- Sweeney, John T. & Roberts, Robin W., 1997. "Cognitive moral development and auditor independence," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 22(3-4), pages 337-352.
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