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Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial

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  • Hay, Bruce L

Abstract

Given the costs of litigation and the availability of pretrial discovery, the question arises why some cases fail to settle at any time in the pretrial period. To examine this problem, the article develops a model of litigation and settlement in which the efforts the parties invest in the case (1) partly determine the strength of the plaintiff's claim and (2) are partly shielded from disclosure. The parties pursue mixed strategies in equilibrium, preventing settlement in a positive fraction of cases. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Hay, Bruce L, 1995. "Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 29-62, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:24:y:1995:i:1:p:29-62
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467951
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    Cited by:

    1. Doornik, Katherine, 2014. "A rationale for mediation and its optimal use," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-10.
    2. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 1996. "The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution," Working Papers 743, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    3. Stéphane TREBUCQ, 2005. "L'actionnaire minoritaire, le commissaire, l'avocat et le juge : histoire d'une fusion litigieuse," Economic History 0503021, EconWPA.
    4. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2008. "Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening," Working Papers 2008-16, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    5. Choné, Philippe & Linnemer, Laurent, 2010. "Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 271-288, November.
    6. Osborne, Evan, 1999. "Who should be worried about asymmetric information in litigation?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 399-409, September.
    7. Heaton, J.B., 2005. "Settlement Pressure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 264-275, June.

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