An Observation about Perfect Equilibria of Two-Player Normal Form Games
It is proved for two-player normal form games that if a totally mixed Nash equilibrium exists then the entire set of Nash equilibria is (trembling-hand) perfect. More generally, it is proved that if there is a (trembling-hand) perfect equilibrium, then all Nash equilibria whose supports are contained in the perfect equilibrium's support are also perfect. The possibility of similar relationships in three or more player games and proper equilibria of two-player games is discussed.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 4-101 Hanson Hall, 1925 Fourth Street South, Minneapolis, MN 55455|
Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roger B. Myerson, 1977.
"Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept,"
295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:minnec:_003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.