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Shock to the System: Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV and Child Mortality

This paper examines the effect of introducing a new HIV/AIDS service, prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT), on overall quality of prenatal and postnatal care. My results suggest that local PMTCT introduction in Zambia may have actually increased all cause child mortality in the short term. There is some evidence that vaccinations may have declined in the short term in association with local PMTCT introduction, suggesting that the new service may have partly crowded out existing pediatric health services.

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File URL: http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/WilsonChildMortality.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Williams College in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2012-03.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision: Jul 2013
Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2012-03
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Web page: http://econ.williams.edu
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  1. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2009. "Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game," Discussion Papers 2009-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Sarah Jacobson & Ragan Petrie, 2010. "Favor Trading in Public Good Provision," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-19, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised Apr 2013.
  3. Sarah Jacobson & Jason Delaney, 2012. "The Good of the Few: Reciprocity in the Provision of a Public Bad," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-02, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  4. Matthew Ellman & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2007. "Organisational structure, communication and group ethics," Working Papers 290, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  6. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1998. "Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 143-161, January.
  7. repec:att:wimass:9309 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Daniel Houser & Robert Kurzban, 2002. "Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1062-1069, September.
  9. Gary Bornstein, 2002. "Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests," Discussion Paper Series dp297, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  10. Christoph Engel & Bettina Rockenbach, 2009. "We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_29, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised May 2011.
  11. Nicholas Wilson, 2010. "Economic Booms and Risky Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Zambian Copper Mining Cities," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-21, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised Oct 2011.
  12. Christoph Engel, 2006. "How Much Collusion. A Meta-Analysis On Oligopoly Experiments," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_27, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  13. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September.
  14. Marwell, Gerald & Ames, Ruth E., 1981. "Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 295-310, June.
  15. Ananish Chaudhuri, 2011. "Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-83, March.
  16. Ferraro, Paul J. & Rondeau, Daniel & Poe, Gregory L., 2000. "Detecting Other-Regarding Behavior with Virtual Players," Working Papers 179537, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
  17. Yan Chen & Sherry Xin Li, 2009. "Group Identity and Social Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 431-57, March.
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