IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wes/weswpa/2023-002.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

CBDC: Banking and Anonymity

Author

Listed:
  • Yuteng Cheng

    (Bank of Canada)

  • Ryuichiro Izumi

    (Department of Economics, Wesleyan University)

Abstract

What is the optimal design of anonymity in a central bank digital currency (CBDC)? We examine this question in the context of bank lending by building a stylized model of anonymity in payment instruments. We specify the anonymity of payment instruments in two dimensions: The bank has no information about the entrepreneur’s investment, and the bank has less control over the entrepreneur’s profits. An instrument with higher anonymity may discourage the bank from lending, and thus, the entrepreneur strategically chooses payment instruments. Our analysis shows that introducing a CBDC with modest anonymity can improve welfare in one equilibrium, but can also destroy valuable information in bank lending, leading to inefficient lending in another equilibrium. Our results suggest that central banks should either make a CBDC highly anonymous or share CBDC data with banks to eliminate this bad equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuteng Cheng & Ryuichiro Izumi, 2023. "CBDC: Banking and Anonymity," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2023-002, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2023-002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.wesleyan.edu/pdf/rizumi/2023002_izumi.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christine A Parlour & Uday Rajan & Haoxiang Zhu, 2022. "When FinTech Competes for Payment Flows," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(11), pages 4985-5024.
    2. Agur, Itai & Ari, Anil & Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, 2022. "Designing central bank digital currencies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 62-79.
    3. Stephen A. Ross, 1977. "The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
    4. He, Zhiguo & Huang, Jing & Zhou, Jidong, 2023. "Open banking: Credit market competition when borrowers own the data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 449-474.
    5. Alessandro Acquisti & Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2016. "The Economics of Privacy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 442-492, June.
    6. Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, 1988. "Signaling in Credit Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 101-129.
    7. Athey, Susan & Catalini, Christian & Tucker, Catherin E., 2017. "The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small Costs, Small Talk," Research Papers 3498, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    8. Lars Peter Hansen & Thomas J Sargent, 2014. "Robust Control and Model Uncertainty," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: UNCERTAINTY WITHIN ECONOMIC MODELS, chapter 5, pages 145-154, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Holmström, Bengt, 2013. "Inside and Outside Liquidity," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262518536, December.
    10. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    11. Rodney J. Garratt & Maarten R. C. van Oordt, 2021. "Privacy as a Public Good: A Case for Electronic Cash," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(7), pages 2157-2180.
    12. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yuteng Cheng & Ryuichiro Izumi, 2024. "Monetary Policy Transmission Through Shadow and Traditional Banks," Staff Working Papers 24-9, Bank of Canada.
    2. Olivier Armantier & Sebastian Doerr & Jon Frost & Andreas Fuster & Kelly Shue, 2024. "Nothing to hide? Gender and age differences in willingness to share data," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 24-99, Swiss Finance Institute.
    3. Ibrahimo, M.V. & Barros, C.P., 2009. "Relevance or irrelevance of capital structure?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 473-479, March.
    4. Toni Ahner & Katrin Assenmacher & Peter Hoffmann & Agnese Leonello & Cyril Monnet & Davide Porcellacchia, 2024. "The Economics of Central Bank Digital Currency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 20(4), pages 221-274, October.
    5. Posey, Lisa L. & Yavas, Abdullah, 2001. "Adjustable and Fixed Rate Mortgages as a Screening Mechanism for Default Risk," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 54-79, January.
    6. Tania Babina & Saleem A. Bahaj & Greg Buchak & Filippo De Marco & Angus K. Foulis & Will Gornall & Francesco Mazzola & Tong Yu, 2024. "Customer Data Access and Fintech Entry: Early Evidence from Open Banking," NBER Working Papers 32089, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Michiel Bijlsma & Carin van der Cruijsen & Nicole Jonker, 2024. "Not all data are created equal - Data sharing and privacy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(11), pages 1250-1267, March.
    8. Agur, Itai & Ari, Anil & Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, 2022. "Designing central bank digital currencies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 62-79.
    9. Hellmann, Thomas & Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000. "Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 281-304, February.
    10. Bracht, Felix & Mahieu, Jeroen & Vanhaverbeke, Steven, 2024. "The signaling value of legal form in entrepreneurial debt financing," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 39(3).
    11. repec:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Innes, Robert, 1986. "Moral Hazard and the Genesis of Farm Debt," CUDARE Working Papers 198349, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    13. SylvieCieply & Bernard Paranque & ., 1997. "French manufacturing firms and the capital gap since1985 - a credit rationing approach," Finance 9708002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 29 Oct 2000.
    14. Syngjoo Choi & Bongseob Kim & Young-Sik Kim & Ohik Kwon, 2023. "Central Bank Digital Currency and Privacy: A Randomized Survey Experiment," BIS Working Papers 1147, Bank for International Settlements.
    15. Ordoñez, Guillermo & Perez-Reyna, David & Yogo, Motohiro, 2019. "Leverage dynamics and credit quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 183-212.
    16. Kentaro Asai & Bruce Grundy & Ryuichiro Izumi, 2025. "Opacity, Signaling, and Bail-ins," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2025-003, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    17. Paul B. McGuinness, 2024. "Research note: An investigation of the relation between pre-IPO dividends and vendor sales," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 889-910, April.
    18. Kim, Sang-Joon & Bae, John & Oh, Hannah, 2019. "Financing strategically: The moderation effect of marketing activities on the bifurcated relationship between debt level and firm valuation of small and medium enterprises," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 663-681.
    19. Bae, John & Kim, Sang-Joon & Oh, Hannah, 2017. "Taming polysemous signals: The role of marketing intensity on the relationship between financial leverage and firm performance," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 29-40.
    20. Svetlana Abramova & Rainer Böhme & Helmut Elsinger & Helmut Stix & Martin Summer, 2022. "What can CBDC designers learn from asking potential users? Results from a survey of Austrian residents (Svetlana Abramova, Rainer Böhme, Helmut Elsinger, Helmut Stix, Martin Summer)," Working Papers 241, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CBDC; Anonymity; Bank lending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2023-002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Manolis Kaparakis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/edwesus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.